A dynamic reasoning system (DRS) is an adaptation of a conventional formal logical system that explicitly portrays reasoning as a temporal activity, with each extralogical input to the system and each inference rule application being viewed as occurring at a distinct timestep. Every DRS incorporates some well-defined logic together with a controller that serves to guide the reasoning process in response to user inputs. Logics are generic, whereas controllers are application specific. Every controller does, nonetheless, provide an algorithm for nonmonotonic belief revision. The general notion of a DRS comprises a framework within which one can formulate the logic and algorithms for a given application and prove that the algorithms are correct, that is, that they serve to (1) derive all salient information and (2) preserve the consistency of the belief set. This article illustrates the idea with ordinary first-order predicate calculus, suitably modified for the present purpose, and two examples. The latter example revisits some classic nonmonotonic reasoning puzzles (Opus the Penguin, Nixon Diamond) and shows how these can be resolved in the context of a DRS, using an expanded version of first-order logic that incorporates typed predicate symbols. All concepts are rigorously defined and effectively computable, thereby providing the foundation for a future software implementation.
INTRODUCTION
The notion of a dynamic reasoning system (DRS) was introduced in Schwartz [1997] for purposes of formulating reasoning involving a logic of qualified syllogisms. The idea arose in an effort to devise some rules for evidence combination. The logic under study included a multivalent semantics where propositions P were assigned a probabilistic likelihood value l (P) in the interval [0, 1] so that the likelihood value plays the role of a surrogate truth value. The situation being modeled is where, based on some evidence, P is assigned a likelihood value l 1 , and then later, based on other evidence, is assigned a value l 2 , and it subsequently is desired to combine these values based on some rule into a resulting value l 3 . This type of reasoning cannot be represented in a conventional formal logical system with the usual Tarski semantics, as such systems do not allow that a proposition may have more than one truth value; otherwise, the semantics would not be mathematically well defined. Thus, the idea arose to speak more explicitly about different occurrences of the propositions P where the occurrences are separated in time.
In this manner, one can construct a well-defined semantics by mapping the different timestamped occurrences of P to different likelihood/truth values.
In turn, this led to viewing a derivation path as it evolves over time as representing the knowledge base, or belief set, of a reasoning agent that is progressively building and modifying its knowledge/beliefs through ongoing interaction with its environment (including inputs from human users or other agents). It also presented a framework within which one can formulate a Doyle-like procedure for nonmonotonic reason maintenance [Doyle 1979; Smith and Kelleher 1988] . Briefly, if the knowledge base harbors inconsistencies due to contradictory inputs from the environment, then in time a contradiction may appear in the reasoning path (knowledge base, belief set), triggering a backtracking procedure aimed at uncovering the culprit propositions that gave rise to the contradiction and disabling (disbelieving) one or more of them so as to remove the inconsistency. Accordingly, the overall reasoning process may be characterized as being nonmonotonic.
Reasoning is nonmonotonic when the discovery and introduction of new information causes one to retract previously held assumptions or conclusions. This is to be contrasted with classical formal logical systems that are monotonic in that the introduction of new information (nonlogical axioms) always increases the collection of conclusions (theorems). The study of nonmonotonic reasoning has its roots in McCarthy and Hayes [1969] . There it was observed that an agent that is reasoning and acting in the world needs to keep track of what is remaining constant as well as what is in process of change. The situation calculus was proposed as a framework for doing this. The essential problem, however, is that it is impossible for any agent to have complete and correct knowledge of its environment. Because of this, there is always an element of uncertainty in the agent's reasoning and decision making. It can happen that the agent may presume that certain things are true and then later discover that they are not. The central issue, therefore, is how best to manage, or model, this type of reasoning.
A decade after the McCarthy and Hayes publication, four different approaches to this problem appeared almost simultaneously. These were the truth maintenance system [Doyle 1979 ] (later renamed as reason maintenance, cf. Smith and Kelleher [1988] ), circumscription [McCarthy 1980 ], default logic [Reiter 1980] , and nonmonotonic logic [McDermott and Doyle 1980] . Further details regarding these, as well as the situation calculus, may be found in Schwartz [1997] . Here it will only be noted that these nowadays are regarded as the classic approaches to nonmonotonic reasoning. Since that time, numerous alternative approaches have emerged. Five of these will be mentioned here.
First is the subject known as belief revision. This also has come to be called the the AGM framework in honor of its originators [Alchourón et al. 1985] . Some key early works in this area are presented in Gardenfors [1988, 1992] . The AGM approach has risen in prominence, due in large part to the publication of Hansson [1999] , which builds upon and substantially advances this framework. AGM defines a belief set as a collection of propositions that is closed with respect to the classical consequence operator, and operations of contraction, expansion, and revision are defined on belief sets. The contraction operation plays the basic role in retracting earlier held beliefs so as to remedy inconsistencies. In this sense, nonmonotonic reasoning can be viewed as a kind of belief revision.
In Hansson [1999] , the important observation was made that a belief set can conveniently be represented as the consequential closure of a finite belief base, and the foregoing AGM operations can be defined in terms of operations performed on belief bases. Since that publication, AGM has enjoyed a steadily growing population of adherents. A recent publication [Fermé and Hansson 2011] overviews the first 25 years of research in this area.
An offshoot of this is more recent work that, instead of focusing on the agent's beliefs regarding its environment, seeks to model the agent's reasoning about the actions it may perform. This bears similarity to the foregoing in that it entails updating the underlying database so as to remove contradictions. Some works of this genre are Eiter et al. [2005] and Varzinczak [2010] .
A second line of research has focused on the temporal aspects of nonmontonic reasoning. The works of Shoham [1986 Shoham [ , 1988 explore the idea of making time an explicit feature of the logical formalism for reasoning about change, and Shoham [1993] describes a vision of agent-oriented programming that portrays reasoning itself as a temporal activity. In other works [Elgot-Drapkin 1988; Elgot-Drapkin et al. 1987 Elgot-Drapkin and Perlis 1990; Miller 1993; ], Perlis and his students have developed the notion of step logic, which studies reasoning as situated in time.
Here reasoning is depicted as occurring in distinct timesteps, with each step consisting of all propositions that can be derived from the previous step by one application of any of the logic's inference rules. This was later renamed as active logic in Miller [1993] .
Another work along these lines is the formulation of nonmonotonicity in terms of first-order semantics provided by Lin and Reiter [1994] . Although this does not mention time explicitly, the temporal aspect is implicit in the notion of forgetting previously held assumptions.
A third development has been a continuation of the ideas underlying Reiter's default logic and McDermott and Doyle's nonmonotonic logic (both referenced in the foregoing). In these systems, one is permitted to derive a conclusion as long as this is consistent with what is currently known (or believed). For example, given that Opus is a bird, and in the absence of any countervailing information, one may conclude by default that Opus can fly. This thus implicitly captures the notion of typicality; to wit, in this case, that typically birds can fly. If at a later time, however, the information is added that Opus is a penguin and it is known that penguins cannot fly, then conclusions are redrawn and the deduction that Opus can fly would be disallowed.
Thus, in this approach, the central idea has been to qualify or otherwise reinterpret the logical consequence relation so as to avoid deductions that may contradict the existing knowledge base. Accordingly, this is not nonmonotonicity in the sense of leading to retractions of previously held propositions, but it addresses the same problem of reasoning from incomplete information. The approach has effects similar to McCarthy's circumscription in that after the new information is entered into the system and the conclusions are redrawn, the resulting set of derived conclusions can be smaller.
A more recent development along these lines are the KLM systems, named after their creators [Kraus et al. 1990 ]. As with nonmonotonic logic, KLM systems employ a Kripke-style possible worlds semantics. Whereas the earlier default logic and nonmonotonic logic employed a special modal operator M in the syntax to represent the qualification "is consistent," KLM captures this same effect through a preference relation among a system's models. This provides a more general framework that subsumes and unifies much of the earlier work, including Reiter's nonmonotonic logic. Some further works along these lines are Lehmann and Magidor [1992] , Lehmann [1995] , and, recently, Britz et al. [2011] .
The fourth approach is dynamic logic programming. The seminal work on this topic is Alferes et al. [1998] . This uses generalized logic programs (i.e., a generalization of Prolog) that allow negations in rule heads, as well as rule bodies, and introduces the notion of an update P ⊕ U of a generalized program P by another generalized program U , where P and U may contain overlapping or mutually contradictory information. In this manner, the theory addresses the issue of managing a dynamically changing knowledge base. The update procedure acts on the syntax of the logic programs and comprises a simple linear-time transformation of P and U . To accommodate the situation where the programs harbor contradictory information, the procedure can be made to conduct contradiction removal. Thus, this embodies a fully computational and efficient model of nonmonotonic reasoning. The work employs the well-known stable model semantics of Gelfond and Lifschitz [1988] to verify that the results of the update procedure are correct. A longer version of the original 1998 paper was published as Alferes et al. [2000] . Further works in this area deserving of mention are Alferes et al. [1999 Alferes et al. [ , 2000 Alferes et al. [ , 2002 Alferes et al. [ , 2005 , Leite et al. [2001] , andŠefránek [2006] .
A fifth approach is answer set programming. This bears resemblance to dynamic logic programming in that it employs a class of generalized logic programs and is based on the same stable model semantics [Gelfond and Lifschitz 1988] . However, here the programs provide even more complex types of expressions, and the theoretical focus is entirely different. The language, known as Answer Set Prolog (or AnsProlog), was introduced in Gelfond and Lifschitz [1991] and studied at length in Baral [2003] . Earmarks of this language is its allowing of default negation (or negation as failure) in the rule bodies and what is called epistemic disjunction, as well as formal negation in rule heads. Regarding the theoretical focus, whereas dynamic logic programming deals with nonmonotonicity in the management of the syntax of a logic program, answer set programming provides logic programs that perform nonmonotonic reasoning about the program's domain of discourse. As such, AnsProlog comprises a fully formalized and computable system for this type of reasoning. Nowadays, there is an extensive literature on this topic, including 12 conferences on logic programming and nonmonotonic reasoning, the most recent of which is Cabalar and Son [2013] . A recent work providing algorithms for computing answer sets with numerous illustrations and applications is Gelfond and Kahl [2014] . In particular, this details algorithms for default reasoning with exceptions.
The DRS framework being presented here has elements in common with Doyle's reason maintenance, AGM belief revision, and step/active logics, but differs from each in important respects. Primarily, it could be regarded as a continuation of Doyle's work, as it relies on the idea of backtracking through a reasoning path to uncover culprit assumptions that led to an inconsistency. One technical difference is that Doyle's system maintains reasons both for believing a proposition and for disbelieving it, whereas the DRS system does not employ the latter. Other than this, the main contributions of the present treatment are that it provides (i) a fully detailed and formalized reasoning system and (ii) the notion of a controller that guides the reasoning processes.
A way in which the present approach differs from the original AGM approach but happens to agree with the views expressed by Hansson [1999] (cf. pp. 15-16) is that it dispenses with two of the original rationality postulates, namely, the requirements that the underlying belief set be at all times (i) consistent and (ii) closed with respect to logical entailment. The latter is sometimes called the omniscience postulate, inasmuch as the modeled agent is thus characterized as knowing all possible logical consequences of its beliefs.
These postulates are intuitively appealing, but dropping them has anthropomorphic rationale, as humans themselves cannot be omniscient in the sense described, and because of this they often harbor inconsistent beliefs without being aware of them. Thus, it is not unreasonable that our agent-oriented reasoning models should have these same characteristics. Remarks to this effect may also be found in the cited pages of Hansson [1999] and are part of the rationale for working with finite belief bases.
Other ways in which the present work differs from the AGM approach may be noted. First, what is here taken as a belief set is neither a belief set in the sense of AGM and Hansson nor a Hansson-style belief base. Rather, it consists of the set of statements that have been input by an external agent as of some time t, together with the consequences of those statements that have been derived in accordance with the algorithms provided in a given controller. Second, by labeling the statements with the timestep when they are entered into the belief set (either by an external agent or derived by means of an inference rule), one can use the labels as a basis for defining the associated algorithms. Third, whereas Gärdenfors, Hansson, and virtually all others who have worked with the AGM framework have confined their language to be only propositional, the present work takes the next step to full first-order predicate logic. This is significant inasmuch as the consistency of a finite set of propositions with respect to the classical consequence operation can be determined by truth-table methods, whereas the consistency of firstorder predicate logic is undecidable (a well-known result proven independently in Church [1936] and Turing [1936] ).
Whereas with Hansson's approach, the general notion of a DRS permits the development over time of an inconsistent belief set, in the illustrations given, a key role of the controller is to discover inconsistencies when they are introduced and then proceed to rectify this by restoring consistency. To prove that the controller accomplishes this, the present work develops a well-defined semantics for the chosen logic and establishes a soundness theorem, which in turn can be used to establish consistency of the resulting belief set.
The DRS framework has in common with step/active logics that it explicitly portrays reasoning as a temporal activity. An important technical difference is that those logics evolve over time as the layers of an onion (as described in the foregoing), whereas a DRS uses a single linear derivation path. This difference is crucial inasmuch as step/active logics tend to grow at an exponential rate, whereas the DRS approach can be kept computationally tractable. In addition, it may be noted that the basic idea of step/active logics currently exists only in the form of some carefully detailed examples and has not yet been developed into a full-fledged formal theory.
The DRS approach has little in common with either KLM theory or the works in logic programming, as it looks at nonmonotonic reasoning from a different perspective. Moreover, the present examples do not address the central issue of default reasoning. It may be noted, however, that the underlying issue of typicality is addressed in Schwartz [1997] via a formulation of fuzzy quantifiers. In effect, a statement such "Typically birds can fly" is rephrased as "Most birds can fly," and a formal logic for reasoning with such quantifiers and related notions is provided. As shown in the previous work, this logic can be taken as the core logic of a DRS. It is planned to revisit this idea in a future work.
The notion of a controller was not discussed in Schwartz [1997] . Its introduction here thus fills an important gap in that treatment. The original conception of a DRS provided a framework for modeling the reasoning processes of an artificial agent to the extent that those processes follow a well-defined logic, but it offered no mechanism for deciding what inference rules to apply at any given time. What was missing was a means to provide the agent with a sense of purpose (i.e., mechanisms for pursuing goals). This deficiency is remedied in the present treatment. The controller responds to inputs from the agent's environment, expressed as propositions in the agent's language. Inputs are classified as being of various types, and, depending on the input type, a reasoning algorithm is applied. Some of these algorithms may cause new propositions to be entered into the belief set, which in turn may invoke other algorithms. These algorithms thus embody the agent's purpose and are domain specific, tailored to a particular application. But in general their role is to ensure that (i) all salient propositions are derived and entered into the belief set and (ii) the belief set remains consistent. As mentioned, the latter is achieved by invoking a Doyle-like reason maintenance algorithm whenever a contradictory proposition is entered into the belief set.
The present work accordingly represents a rethinking, refinement, and extension of the earlier work, aimed at (i) providing mathematical clarity to some relevant concepts that previously were not explicitly defined, (ii) introducing the notion of a controller and spelling out its properties, and (iii) illustrating these ideas with a small collection of example applications. This effort may be viewed as laying the groundwork for a future project to produce a software implementation of the DRS framework, this being a domain-independent software framework into which can be plugged domain-specific modules as required for any given application. Note that the present mathematical work is a necessary prerequisite for the software implementation inasmuch as this provides the needed formal basis for an unambiguous set of requirements specifications.
Section 2 provides a fully detailed definition of the notion of a DRS. Section 3 presents the syntax and semantics for first-order predicate logic, suitably adapted for the present purpose, and proves a series of needed results including a Soundness Theorem. This section also introduces some derived inference rules for use in the ensuing example applications. Section 4 illustrates the core ideas in an application to a simple document classification system. Section 5 extends this to an application for multiple-inheritance reasoning, a form of default reasoning underlying frame-based expert systems. This provides new resolutions for some well-known puzzles from the literature on nonmonotonic reasoning. Section 6 consists of concluding remarks.
Regarding the examples, it may be noted that a Subsumption inference rule plays a central role, giving the present work elements in common also with the work on description logic (DL) (c.f. Baader et al. [2003] ). The DL notion of a role is not employed here, however, inasmuch as the concept of an object having certain properties is modeled in Section 5 through the use of typed predicate symbols.
An earlier, condensed version of Sections 2, 3, and 4 has been published as Schwartz [2010] . The work of Ustymenko and Schwartz [2008a, 2010a] contains precursors to the present notion of a DRS controller, and a DRS application using a logic of belief and trust has been described in Ustymenko [2008] and Ustymenko and Schwartz [2008b , 2010a , 2010b . Although the present work employs classical first-order predicate calculus, the DRS framework can accommodate any logic for which there exists a well-defined syntax and semantics.
All proofs of propositions and theorems have been placed in the electronic appendix.
DYNAMIC REASONING SYSTEMS
A dynamic reasoning system (DRS) is a model of an artificial agent's reasoning processes to the extent that those processes adhere to the principles of some well-defined logic. Formally, it is composed of a path logic, which provides all elements necessary for reasoning, and a controller, which guides the reasoning process. These two components are defined in Sections 2.1 and 2.2. For contrast, and by way of introductory overview, the basic structure of a classical formal logic system is portrayed in Figure 1 and that of a DRS in Figure 2 . A classical system is defined by providing a language consisting of a set of propositions, selecting certain propositions to serve as axioms, and specifying a set of inference rules saying how from certain premises one can derive certain conclusions. The theorems then amount to all propositions that can be derived from the axioms by means of the rules. Such systems are monotonic in that adding new axioms always serves to increase the set of theorems. Axioms are of two kinds: logical and extralogical (or proper, or nonlogical). The logical axioms together with the inference rules comprise the logic. The extralogical axioms express information about the application domain. A DRS begins similarly with specifying a language consisting of a set of propositions. But here the logic is given in terms of a set of axioms schemas, some inference rules as of the type just discussed, and some rules for instantiating the schemas. The indicated derivation path serves as the belief set. Logical axioms may be entered into the derivation path by applying instantiation rules. Extralogical axioms are entered from an external source (e.g., human user, another agent, a mechanical sensor, etc.). Thus, the derivation path evolves over time, with propositions being entered into the path either as extralogical axioms or derived by means of inference rules in accordance with the algorithms provided in the controller. Whenever a new proposition is entered into the path it is marked as "believed." In the event that a contradiction arises in the derivation path, a nonmonotonic belief revision process is invoked that leads to certain previously believed propositions becoming disbelieved, thereby removing the contradiction. The full details for the two components of a DRS are given in Sections 2.1 and 2.2.
Path Logic
A path logic consists of a language, axiom schemas, inference rules, and a derivation path, as follows.
Language. Here denoted L, this consists of all expressions (or formulas) that can be generated from a given set σ of symbols in accordance with a collection of production rules (or an inductive definition, or some similar manner of definition). As symbols typically are of different types (individual variables, constants, predicate symbols, etc.), it is assumed that there is an unlimited supply (uncountably many if necessary) of each type. Moreover, as is customary, some symbols will be logical symbols (e.g., logical connectives, quantifiers, and individual variables), and some will be extralogical symbols (e.g., individual constants and predicate symbols). It is assumed that L contains at least sufficient syntax to express contradictions, where a contradiction is an expression that in classical logic would be equivalent with an expression of the form P ∧ ¬P. 1 Axiom schemas. Expressed in some metanotation, these describe the expressions of L that are to serve as logical axioms.
Inference rules. These must include one or more rules that enable instantiation of the axiom schemas. All other inference rules will be of the usual kind, that is, stating that from expressions having certain forms (premise expressions), one may infer an expression of some other form (a conclusion expression). Of the latter, two kinds are allowed: logical rules, which are considered to be part of the underlying logic, and extralogical rules, which are associated with the intended application. Note that logical axioms are expressions that are derived by applying the axiom schema instantiation rules. Inference rules may be viewed formally as mappings from L into itself.
The rule set may include derived rules that simplify deductions by encapsulating frequently used argument patterns. Rules derived using only logical axioms and logical rules will also be logical rules, and derived rules whose derivations employ extralogical rules will be additional extralogical rules.
Derivation paths. These consist of a sequence of pairs (L 0 , B 0 ), (L 1 , B 1 ), . . . , where L t is the sublanguage of L that is in use at time t, and B t is the belief set in effect at time t. Such a sequence is generated as follows. Since languages are determined by the symbols that they employ, it is useful to speak more directly in terms of the set σ t comprising the symbols in use at time t and then let L t be the sublanguage of L that is based on the symbols in σ t . With this in mind, let σ 0 be the logical symbols of L so that L 0 is the minimal language employing only logical symbols, and let B 0 = ∅. Then, given (L t , B t ), the pair (L t+1 , B t+1 ) is formed in one of the following ways:
(1) σ t+1 = σ t (so that L t+1 = L t ) and B t+1 is obtained from B t by adding an expression that is derived by application of an inference rule that instantiates an axiom schema.
(2) σ t+1 = σ t and B t+1 is obtained from B t by adding an expression that is derived from expressions appearing earlier in the path by application of an inference rule of the kind that infers a conclusion from some premises. (3) σ t+1 = σ t and an expression employing these symbols is added to B t to form B t+1 . (4) Some new extralogical symbols are added to σ t to form σ t+1 , and an expression employing the new symbols is added to B t to form B t+1 . (5) σ t+1 = σ t and B t+1 is obtained from B t by applying a belief revision algorithm as described in the following.
Note that the use of axiom schemas together with schema instantiation rules here replaces the customary approach of defining logical axioms as all formulas having the forms described by the schemas and then including these axioms among the set of theorems. The reason for adopting this alternative approach is to ensure that the DRS formalism is finitary and hence machine implementable-it is not possible to represent an infinite set of axioms (or theorems) on a computer. That the two approaches are equivalent should be obvious. Expressions entered into the belief set in accordance with either (3) or (4) will be extralogical axioms. A DRS can generate any number of different derivation paths, depending on the extralogical axioms that are input and the inference rules that are applied.
Whenever an expression is entered into the belief set, it is assigned a label comprised of:
(1) A timestamp, this being the value of the subscript t + 1 on the set B t+1 formed by entering the expression into the belief set in accordance with any of the foregoing items (1) through (4). The timestamp effectively serves as an index indicating the expression's position in the belief set.
(2) A from-list, indicating how the expression came to be entered into the belief set. In case the expression is entered in accordance with the foregoing item (1) (i.e., using a schema instantiation rule), this list consists of the name (or other identifier) of the schema and the name (or other identifier) of the inference rule if the system has more than one such rule. In case the expression is entered in accordance with the foregoing item (2), the list consists of the indexes (timestamps) of the premise expressions and the name (or other identifier) of the inference rule. In case the expression is entered in accordance with either of items (3) or (4) (i.e., is an extralogical axiom), the list will consist of some code indicating this (e.g., es standing for "external source") possibly together with some identifier or other information regarding the source. (3) A to-list, being a list of indexes of all expressions that have been entered into the belief set as a result of rule applications involving the given expression as a premise. Thus, to-lists may be updated at any future time. (4) A status indicator having the value bel or disbel according as the proposition asserted by the expression currently is believed or disbelieved. The primary significance of this status is that only expressions that are believed can serve as premises in inference rule applications. Whenever an expression is first entered into the belief set, it is assigned status bel. This value may then be changed during belief revision at a later time. When an expression's status is changed from bel to disbel, it is said to have been retracted. (5) An epistemic entrenchment factor, this being a numerical value indicating the strength with which the proposition asserted by the expression is held. This terminology is adopted in recognition of the work by Gärdenfors [1988 Gärdenfors [ , 1992 , who initiated this concept, and is used here for essentially the same purpose, namely to assist when making decisions regarding belief retractions. Depending on the application, however, this value might alternatively be interpreted as a degree of belief, as a certainty factor, as a degree of importance, or some other type of value to be used for this purpose. 2 In the present treatment, epistemic entrenchment values are assigned only to axioms. No provision for propagating these factors to expressions derived via rule inferences is provided, although this would be a natural extension of the present treatment. It is agreed that logical axioms always receive the highest possible epistemic entrenchment value, whatever scale or range may be employed. (6) A knowledge category specification, having one of the values a priori, a posteriori, analytic, and synthetic. These terms are employed in recognition of the philosophical tradition initiated by Kant [1935] . Logical axioms are designated as a priori, extralogical axioms are designated as a posteriori, expressions whose derivations 2 Gärdenfors asserts that the notion of a degree of epistemic entrenchment is distinct from that of a degree (or probability) of belief. "This degree [of entrenchment] is not determined by how probable a belief is judged to be but rather by how important the belief is to inquiry and deliberation" [Gardenfors 1988, p. 17] . Nonetheless, degrees of belief could be used as a basis for managing belief retraction if this were deemed appropriate for a given application. employ only logical axioms and logical inference rules are designated as analytic, and expressions whose derivations employ any extralogical axioms or extralogical rules are designated as synthetic. The latter is motivated by the intuition that an ability to apply inference rules and thereby carry out logical derivations is itself a priori knowledge, so that even if the premises in a rule application are all a posteriori and/or the rule itself is extralogical, the rule application entails a combination of a priori and a posteriori knowledge, and the conclusion of the application therefore qualifies as synthetic (rather than a posteriori) under most philosophical interpretations of this term.
Thus, when an expression P is entered into the belief set, it is more exactly entered as an expression-label pair (P, λ) , where λ is the label. A DRS's language, axiom schemas, and inference rules comprise a logic in the usual sense. It is required that this logic be consistent (i.e., for no expression P, is it possible to derive both P and ¬P). The belief set may become inconsistent, nonetheless, through the introduction of contradictory extralogical axioms.
In what follows, only expressions representing a posteriori and synthetic knowledge may be retracted; expressions of a priori knowledge are taken as being held unequivocally. Therefore, the term "a priori knowledge" is taken as synonymous with "belief held unequivocally," and "a posteriori knowledge" is interpreted as "belief possibly held only tentatively" (some a posteriori beliefs may be held unequivocally). Thus, the distinction between knowledge and belief is some what blurred, and what is referred to as a belief set might alternatively be called a knowledge base, as is often the practice in AI systems.
Controller
A controller effectively determines the modeled agent's purpose or goals by managing the DRS's interaction with its environment and guiding the reasoning process. With regard to the latter, the objectives typically include (i) deriving all expressions salient to the given application and entering these into the belief set and (ii) ensuring that the belief set remains consistent. To these ends, the business of the controller amounts to performing the following operations:
(1) Receiving input from its environment, for example, human users, sensors, or other artificial agents; expressing this input as expressions in the given language L; and entering these expressions into the belief set in the manner described earlier (derivation path items (3) and (4)). During this operation, new symbols are appropriated as needed to express concepts not already represented in the current L t .
(2) Applying inference rules in accordance with some extralogical objective (some plan, purpose, or goal) and entering the derived conclusions into the belief set in the manner described in the foregoing (derivation path items (1) and (2)). (3) Performing any actions that may be prescribed as a result of the foregoing reasoning process, such as moving a robotic arm, returning a response to a human user, or sending a message to another artificial agent. (4) Whenever necessary, applying a Dialectical Belief Revision algorithm for contradiction resolution in the manner described in the following. (5) Applying any other belief revision algorithm as may be prescribed by the context of a particular application.
In some systems, the foregoing items may include other types of belief revision operations, but such will not be considered in the present work.
Contradiction resolution is triggered whenever a contradiction, or a designated equivalent expression such as the falsum ⊥, is entered into the belief set. We may assume that this only occurs as the result of an inference rule application, as it obviously would make no sense to enter a contradiction directly as an extralogical axiom. The contradiction resolution algorithm entails three steps:
(1) Starting with the from-list in the label on the contradictory expression, backtrack through the belief set following from-lists until one identifies all extralogical axioms that were involved in the contradiction's derivation. Note that such extralogical axioms must exist, since, by the consistency of the logic, the contradiction cannot constitute analytical knowledge and hence must be synthetic.
(2) Change the belief status of one or more of these extralogical axioms, as many as necessary to invalidate the derivation of the given contradiction. The decision as to which axioms to retract may be dictated, or at least guided by, the epistemic entrenchment values. In effect, those expressions with the lower values would be preferred for retraction. In some systems, this retraction process may be automated, and in others it may be human assisted.
(3) Forward chain through to-lists starting with the extralogical axiom(s) just retracted, and retract all expressions whose derivations depended on those axioms. These retracted expressions should include the contradiction that triggered this round of belief revision (otherwise, the correct extralogical axioms were not retracted).
This belief revision algorithm is reminiscent of Hegel's dialectic, described as a process of negation of the negation [Hegel 1910 ]. In that treatment, the latter (first occurring) negation is a perceived internal conflict (here a contradiction), and the former (second occurring) one is an act of transcendence aimed at resolving the conflict (here removing the contradiction). In recognition of Hegel, the belief revision/retraction process formalized in the foregoing algorithm will be called Dialectical Belief Revision.
It is to be stressed that the controller is always application specific and typically will incorporate additional components necessary for the intended application. In particular, the examples given in Sections 4 and 5 add a third component to the pairs appearing in the derivation paths discussed in Section 2.1. In Section 4, this third component is a graph comprising a concept taxonomy that is constructed and maintained via the reasoning processes. In Section 5, the third component is a graph that records an extralogical specificity relation that the controller employs during the reasoning process.
General Remarks
Specifying a DRS requires specifying a path logic and a controller. A path logic is specified by providing (i) a language L, (ii) a set of axiom schemas, and (iii) a set of inference rules. A controller is specified by providing (i) the types of expressions that the DRS can receive as inputs from external sources, with each such type typically being described as expressions having a certain form, and (ii) for each such input type, an algorithm that is to be executed when the DRS receives an input of that type. Such an algorithm typically involves applying inference rules, thereby deriving new formulas to be entered into the belief set, and it might specify other actions as well, such as moving a robotic arm, writing some information to a file, or returning a response to the user. All controllers are assumed to include a mechanism for dialectical belief revision as described in the foregoing.
Thus defined, a DRS may be viewed as representing the "mind" of an intelligent agent, where this includes both the agent's reasoning processes and its memory. At any time t, the belief set B t represents the agent's conscious awareness as of that time. Since the extralogical axioms can entail inconsistencies, this captures the fact that an agent can harbor inconsistencies without being aware of this. The presence of inconsistencies only becomes evident to the agent when they lead to a contradictory expression being explicitly entered into the belief set, in effect making the agent consciously aware of a contradiction that was implicit in its beliefs. This then triggers a belief revision process aimed at removing the inconsistency that gave rise to the contradiction.
Depending on the application, the controller may be programmed to carry out axiom schema instantiations and perform derivations based on logical axioms. Such might be the case, for example, if the logical rules were to include a resolution rule and the controller incorporated a Prolog-like theorem prover. In many applications, however, it may be more appropriate to base the controller on a few suitably chosen derived rules. The objective in this would be to simplify the controller's design by encapsulating frequently used argument patterns. In such cases, the use of axiom schemas and logical inference rules is implicit, but no logical axioms per se need be entered into the derivation path. Accordingly, all members of the belief set will be either a posteriori or synthetic and thus subject to belief revision. This is illustrated in the examples that follow.
FIRST-ORDER LOGIC

Formalism
This section presents classical first-order logic in a form suitable for incorporation into a DRS. The treatment follows Hamilton [1988] . As symbols for the language L, we shall have individual variables, x 1 , x 2 , . . . (denoted generically by x, y, z, etc.); individual constants, a 1 , a 2 , . . . (denoted generically by a, b, c, etc.); predicate symbols, infinitely many for each arity, where arity is indicated by superscripts,
. . . (denoted generically by α, β, γ , etc.); punctuation marks, namely the comma and left and right parentheses; the logical connectives ¬ and →; the (universal) quantifier symbol, ∀; and the falsum symbol, ⊥. 3 Here the logical symbols will be the individual variables, punctuation marks, logical connectives, quantifier symbol, and falsum symbol. The extralogical symbols will be the individual constants and the predicate symbols. Thus, as discussed in Section 2.1, the sublanguages L t of L will differ only in their choice of individual constants and predicate symbols.
Given a sublanguage L of L, the terms of L will be the individual variables and the individual constants of L. The atomic formulas of L will be the falsum symbol and all expressions of the form α(t 1 , . . . , t n ), where α is an n-ary predicate symbol of L and t 1 , . . . , t n are terms of L. The formulas of L will be the atomic formulas of L together with all expressions having the forms (¬P), (P → Q), and (∀x)P, where P and Q are formulas of L and x is an individual variable.
Further logical connectives and the existential quantifier symbol can be introduced as means for abbreviating other formulas:
For readability, parentheses may be dropped according to (i) ¬ takes priority over ∨ and ∧, (ii) ∨ and ∧ take priority over → and ↔, and (iii) outermost surrounding parentheses are unneeded.
In a formula of the form (∀x)Q, the expression (∀x) is a (universal) quantifier and Q is the scope of the quantifier. If x occurs in a formula P within the scope of an occurrence of (∀x) in P, then that occurrence of x is bound in P by that occurrence of (∀x). If x occurs in P and is not bound by any quantifier, then that occurrence of x is free in P. Note that the same variable x can have both free and bound occurrences in the same formula P. A formula that does not contain any free variable occurrences is closed.
If an occurrence of x is free in P, then a different variable y is substitutable for that occurrence of x if the occurrence is not within the scope of the quantifier (∀y) (i.e., putting y in place of x does not create a binding of y). Note that this implies that x is always substitutable for any of its own free occurrences in any P. An individual constant a is substitutable for any free occurrence of any variable in any P.
Where P is a formula, x is an individual variable, and t is an individual term that is substitutable for x in P, P(t/x) denotes the formula obtained from P by replacing all free occurrences of x in P with occurrences of t. Note that the foregoing implies that if x does not occur free in P, or does not appear at all in P, then P(t/x) is just P. Note also that if t is not substitutable for x in P, then the notation P(t/x) is undefined.
This notation can be extended to arbitrarily many simultaneous replacements as follows. Where P is a formula, the variables x 1 , . . . , x n are distinct, and the terms t 1 , . . . , t n are substitutable for all of the free occurrences of the respective variables x 1 , . . . , x n in P, P(t 1 , . . . , t n /x 1 , . . . , x n ) denotes the formula obtained from P by replacing all occurrences of x 1 , . . . , x n , respectively, with occurrences of t 1 , . . . , t n .
The axiom schemas will be the metalevel expressions (observing the same rules as for formulas for dropping parentheses):
Let the formula metasymbols A, B, C be denoted generically by A 1 , A 2 , . . . , and let x be the individual variable metasymbol. Where S is a schema, let S(P 1 , . . . , P n , x/A 1 , . . . , A n , x) be the formula obtained from S by replacing all occurrences of A 1 , . . . , A n , respectively, with occurrences of P 1 , . . . , P n and replacing each occurrence of x with an occurrence of the individual variable x.
The inference rules will be: Regarding (R2), note first that if x occurs free in P, since x is substitutable for itself in P, by taking x for t this rule allows one to derive (∀x)P → P. Next note that if x does not occur free in P, then by definition of the notation (t/x), P(t/x) is just P, and the same rule allows one to to derive (∀x)P → P. It follows that all formulas of the form (∀x)P → P are logical axioms. It is not difficult to establish that if one leaves out (S4), this formalism is equivalent to the first-order predicate calculus of Hamilton [1988] . The present (S1), (S2), (S3), and (S6) are identical to Hamilton's (K1), (K2), (K3), and (K6), and it can be seen that (S5) together with (S2) effectively replaces Hamilton's (K4) and (K5) under the present restricted notion of term that does not involve function symbols and the agreement that writing P(t/x) implies that t is substitutable for x in P. To wit, the foregoing note that if x does not occur free in P, then one can derive (∀x)P → P, gives (K4), and (K5) is obtained by the fact that if t is substitutable for x in P, then one can derive (∀x)P → P(t/x). Thus, all of Hamilton's logical axioms are logical axioms here. Moreover, excluding (S4), the present formalism does not permit the introduction of logical axioms not found in Hamilton's calculus. In other words, with the exception of (S4), both formalisms have that same logical axioms. Because of this equivalence, the present formalism can make use of numerous results proved in Hamilton [1988] . Moreover, Hamilton's system differs from that of Mendelson [1987] only in Hamilton's (K3), and Exercise 4 in Chapter 2 of Hamilton [1988] shows that Hamilton's and Mendelson's systems are equivalent. This allows appropriation of numerous results from Mendelson [1987] .
A (first-order) theory T will consist of a sublanguage of the foregoing language L, denoted L T , the foregoing axiom schemas (1) through (6), the foregoing inference rules (1) through (6), and a set of formulas of L T to serve as extralogical axioms of T . By a proof in T is meant a sequence P 1 , . . . , P n of formulas of L T such that each P i is either (i) a logical axiom (i.e., is derivable by means of one of the Schema Instantiation rules (1) through (3), (ii) an extralogical axiom, or (iii) can be inferred from formulas occurring before P i in the sequence by means of either Modus Ponens or Generalization. Such a sequence is a proof of the last member P n . A formula of L T is a theorem of T if it has a proof in T . The notation T P is used to indicate that P is a theorem of T , and T P is used to indicate the contrary.
Consider an entry (L t , B t ) in the derivation path of a DRS as defined in Section 2.1. A formula in B t will be active if its status is bel; otherwise, it is inactive. The theory determined by (L t , B t ) will be first-order theory T t whose language is L t and whose extralogical axioms are the active extralogical axioms in B t .
The Dialectical Belief Revision algorithm has the effect of changing the status of some formulas in the belief set from bel to disbel. This is true also for other belief revision algorithms. Because of this there is no guarantee that the fact that the active extralogical axioms in B t are the extralogical axioms of T t implies that the active formulas in B t are all theorems of T t . That this implication can sometimes fail motivates the following.
A belief revision algorithm for a DRS is normal if for any entry (L t , B t ) in a derivation path for the DRS, given that the active formulas in B t are theorems of the theory T t determined by (L t , B t ), the active formulas in the belief set B t that results from an application of that algorithm will be theorems of the theory T t determined by (L t , B t ).
PROPOSITION 3.1. For any DRS, Dialectical Belief Revision is normal.
A DRS is normal if all of its belief revision algorithms are normal. PROPOSITION 3.2. In a normal DRS, for each theory T t determined by a pair (L t , B t ) in a derivation path for the DRS, the active formulas in B t will be theorems of T t .
Where is a set of formulas in L T , let T ( ) be the theory obtained from T by adjoining the members of as extralogical axioms. PROPOSITION 3.3. Let T t be the theory determined by an entry (L t , B t ) in the derivation path for a normal DRS, let T be the theory with language L t and no extralogical axioms, and let be the set of active formulas in B t . Then, for any formula P of L t , T t P if and only if T ( ) P.
It is assumed that the reader is familiar with the notion of tautology from the propositional calculus (PC). Axiom schemas (S1), (S2), and (S3), together with Modus Ponens, are the axiomatization of PC found in Hamilton [1988] . Where T is a theory and P is a formula of L T , let T PC P indicate that P has a proof in T using only (S1), (S2), and (S3), Instantiation 1, and Modus Ponens. Then, by treating atomic formulas of L as propositions of PC, one has the following. These theorems can be used to show that axiom schema (S4) serves merely as a defining axiom for ⊥ and does not enable proving any additional formulas not involving ⊥. Let T PC(⊥) P indicate that P has a proof in T using only (S1), (S2), (S3), and (S4); Schema Instantiation 1; and Modus Ponens. A theorem of T is said to be derivable in T . A formula P is said to be derivable from in T if T ( ) P. Note that this is equivalent to saying that if T Q, for all Q ∈ , then T P. When is given as a list of one or more formulas (e.g., {P 1 , . . . , P n }), the surrounding braces will be dropped, that is, T ({P 1 , . . . , P n }) will be shortened to T (P 1 , . . . , P n ).
An inference rule is a statement of the form "From some premises having some forms A 1 , . . . , A n , infer the conclusion having some form A." In the context of a theory T , an inference rule may be viewed as a mapping from L T into itself, with an application of the rule being represented as an n + 1-tuple of formulas of L T , (P 1 , . . . , P n , P), where P 1 , . . . , P n are the premises and P is the conclusion. An inference rule is valid (or derivable) in a theory T if the conclusion is always derivable from the premises in T (i.e., if T (P 1 , . . . , P n ) P). Consider the following inference rules for an arbitrary T . Hypothetical Syllogism is a well-known principle of classical logic. Aristotelian Syllogism captures the reasoning embodied in the famous argument "All men are mortal; Socrates is a man; therefore Socrates is mortal," by taking P for "is a man," Q for "is mortal," and a for "Socrates." A concept A subsumes concept B if the set of objects represented by A contains the set represented by B as a subset. Thus, Subsumption captures the transitivity of this subsumption relationship. In the context of a DRS, Conflict Detection can be used for triggering Dialectical Belief Revision. This is an example on one such triggering rule; others surely are possible.
Aristotelian Syllogism, Subsumption, and Conflict Detection will be used in the application developed in Section 4. In this respect, they may be considered to be application specific. They are not domain specific, however, inasmuch as they happen to be valid in any first-order theory, as demonstrated by the following.
PROPOSITION 3.5. The foregoing seven inference rules are valid in any theory T .
. A theory T is consistent if and only if there is a formula P of L T such that T P.
This shows that any inconsistent system with the full strength of first-order logic is trivial in that all formulas are formally derivable.
A set of formulas of a language L is consistent if the theory T with language L and with the formulas in as extralogical axioms is consistent; otherwise, is inconsistent.
PROPOSITION 3.7. For an entry (L t , B t ) in the derivation path of a normal DRS, B t is consistent if and only if the theory T t determined by (L t , B t ) is consistent.
Semantics and Main Results Regarding First-Order Logic
This formulation of a semantics for first-order logic follows Shoenfield [1967] . Let T be a theory of the kind described in the foregoing. An interpretation I for the language L T consists of (i) a nonempty set D I serving as the domain of I, the elements of which are called individuals; (ii) for each individual constant a of L T , assignment of a unique individual I(a) ∈ D I ; and (iii) for each n-ary predicate symbol α of L T , assignment of an n-ary relation I(α) on D I . For each individual d ∈ D I , letd be a new individual constant (i.e., one not among the individual constants of L T ) to serve as the name of d. Let L T (I) be the language obtained from L T by adjoining the names of the individuals in D I as new extralogical symbols. Where I is an interpretation for L T , let I(d) = d for all d ∈ D I . For P a formula of a language L and I an interpretation for L, an I-instance of P is a formula of the form P(d 1 , . . . ,d n /x 1 , . . . , x n ), where x 1 , . . . , x n are the distinct individual variables occurring free in P and d 1 , . . . , d n ∈ D I . Note that I-instances as defined are closed.
Given an interpretation I for a language L, a truth valuation is a mapping v I : closed formulas of L(I) → {T, F} satisfying:
(1) For P being the atomic formula ⊥, v I (P) = F.
(2) For P atomic and having the form α(t 1 , . . . , t n ), v(P) = T if and only if (I(t 1 ), . . . , I(t n )) ∈ I(α) (the relation I(α) holds for the n-tuple (I(t 1 ), . . . , I(t n )). Note that since P is closed, the t i must all be individual constants and may be names of individuals in D I . Items 3 and 4 encapsulate the usual truth tables for ¬ and →. By definition of the various abbreviated forms, it will follow that for closed P: PROPOSITION 3.9. For any language L, the logical axioms of L (i.e., all formulas derivable by means of the schema instantiation rules (R1) through (R3)) are logically valid.
An inference rule is validity preserving if for every application (P 1 , . . . , P n , P) composed of formulas in a language L T for a theory T , and for every interpretation I for L T , I |= P 1 , . . . , I |= P n implies I |= P. One can establish the converse, referred to in Hamilton [1988] as the Adequacy Theorem (Proposition 4.41) . This also appears in Mendelson [1987] as Corollary 2.18. The proof in Hamilton [1988] can be adapted to the present system because of the equivalence between that system and the formalism studied here. It is only necessary to verify that the present notion of semantic interpretation is equivalent to that of Hamilton [1988] . This amounts to observing that the present notion of I-instance is equivalent with the notion of "valuation" in Hamilton [1988] . Details are omitted, as this result in not needed in the present work.
An interpretation I for the language of a theory T is a model of T if all theorems of T are valid in I. The notation I |= T expresses that I is a model of T . THEOREM 3.4 (CONSISTENCY THEOREM). If a theory T has a model, then T is consistent. PROPOSITION 3.11. If T is a theory with no extralogical axioms, then T is consistent.
An interpretation for a language L is a model for a set of formulas of L if all formulas in are valid in I. The notation I |= expresses that I is a model of . For an entry (B t , L t ) in the derivation path for a DRS (Section 2.1), an interpretation I for L t will be a model of B t if I |= , where is the set of active formulas in B t . Let I |= B t indicate that I is a model of B t . PROPOSITION 3.13. Let (B t , L t ) be an entry in a derivation path for a normal DRS. If there is an interpretation I of L t that is a model of B t , then B t is consistent.
EXAMPLE 1: A DOCUMENT MANAGEMENT ASSISTANT
A DRS is used to represent the reasoning processes of an artificial agent interacting with its environment. For this purpose, the belief set should include a model of the agent's environment, with this model evolving over time as the agent acquires more information about the environment. This section illustrates this idea with a simple DRS based on first-order logic representing an agent that assists its human users in creating and managing a taxonomic document classification system. Thus, the environment in this case consists of the document collection together with its users. The objective in employing such an agent is to build concept taxonomies suitable for browsing. In this manner, the DRS functions as a document management assistant (DMA).
In the DMA, documents are represented by individual constants, and document classes are represented by unary predicate symbols. Membership of document a in class α is expressed by the atomic formula α(a); the property of class α being a subset of class β is expressed by (∀x)(α(x) → β(x)), where x is any individual variable; and the property of two classes α and β being disjoint is expressed by (∀x)(¬(α(x) ∧ β(x))), where x is any individual variable. A taxonomic classification hierarchy may thus be constructed by entering formulas of these forms into the belief set as extralogical axioms. It will be assumed that these axioms are input by human users.
In addition to the belief set, the DMA will employ an extralogical graphical structure representing the taxonomy. A formula of the form α(a) will be represented by an isan-element-of link from a node representing a to a node representing α, a formula of the form (∀x)(α(x) → β(x)) will be represented by an is-a-subclass-of link from a node representing α to a node representing β, and a formula of the form (∀x)(¬(α(x) ∧ β(x))) will be represented by an are-disjoint link between some nodes representing α and β. This structure will be organized as a directed acyclic graph (DAG) without redundant links with respect to the is-an-element-of and is-a-subclass-of links (i.e., ignoring are-disjoint links), where by a redundant link is meant a direct link from some node to an ancestor of that node other than the node's immediate ancestors (i.e., other than its parents). To this end, the controller will maintain a data structure that represents the current state of this graph. Whenever an axiom expressing a documentclass membership is entered into the belief set, a corresponding is-an-element-of link will be entered into the graph, unless this would create a redundant path. Whenever an axiom expressing a subclass-superclass relationship is entered into the belief set, an is-a-subclass-of link will be entered into the graph, unless this would create either a cycle or a redundant path. Whenever an axiom expressing class disjointedness is entered into the belief set, a corresponding link expressing this will be entered into the graph. To accommodate this activity, the derivation path as a sequence of pairs is augmented to become a sequence of triples (L t , B t , G t ), where G t is the state of the graph at time t. This is illustrated in Figure 3 , showing a graph that would be defined by entering the following formulas into the belief set, where TheLibrary, Science, Engineering, Humanities, ComputerScience, Philosophy, and ArtificialIntelligence are taken as alternative labels for the predicate letters A 1 1 , . . . , A 1 7 , where Doc1, Doc2, Doc3 are alternative labels for the individual constants a 1 , a 2 , a 3 , and where x is the individual variable x 1 :
(∀x)(Science(x) → TheLibrary(x)) (∀x)(Engineering(x) → TheLibrary(x)) (∀x)(Humanities(x) → TheLibrary(x)) (∀x)(ComputerScience(x) → Science(x)) Dynamic Reasoning Systems 32:19
The overall purpose of the DMA is to support browsing and search by the human users. The browsing capability is provided by the graph. For this, one would develop tools for drilling down through the graph, progressively narrowing in on specific topics of interest. User queries would consist of keyword searches and would employ the belief set directly (i.e., they do not necessarily require the graph). In such queries, the keywords are presumed to be the names of classification categories. The algorithms associated with the DMA's controller are designed to derive all document-category classifications implicit in the graph and enter these into the belief set. These documentcategory pairs can be stored in a simple database, and keyword searches, possibly involving multiple keywords connected by "or" or "and" can be implemented as database queries. For "and" queries, however, one may alternatively use the graph structure to find those categories' common descendants.
As described in Section 2.1, entering a formula into the belief set also entails possibly expanding the current language by adding any needed new symbols and assigning the new formula an appropriate label. For the foregoing formulas, the from-list will consist of an indication that the source of the formula was a human user. Let us use the code hu for this (as an alternative to the aforementioned es). As an epistemic entrenchment value, let us arbitrarily assign each formula the value 0.5 on the scale [0, 1]. Thus, each label will have the form {t, {hu}, ∅, bel, 0.5, a posteriori}.
Using 0.5 for the epistemic entrenchment value effectively makes these values nonfunctional with respect to Dialectical Belief Revision. When a choice must be made regarding which of several formulas to disbelieve, this choice will either be random or made by the human user.
Whenever the user wishes to enter a new formula into the belief set, the formula is provided to the controller, which executes a reasoning process depending on the type (or form) of the formula. This process may lead to the controller carrying out inference rule applications, the results of which are provided back to the controller, which may in turn lead to further rule applications and/or belief revision processes. In this activity, the controller additionally modifies the language and graph as appropriate. As discussed in Section 2.2, the general purpose of a controller is twofold: (i) to derive all salient information for the intended application and (ii) to ensure that the belief set remains consistent. In the present case, the salient information is the graph together with the document classifications implicit in the graph, that is, all formulas of the form α(a) that can be derived from the formulas describing the graph. In an application, these category-document pairs can be stored in a simple database and used for keywordbased sorting and retrieval (search).
Formal Specification of the Document Management Assistant
These considerations motivate the following formal specification for the DMA. For the path logic, let the language be the language L for first-order logic defined in Section 3.1, let the axiom schemas be (S1) through (S6), and let the inference rules be (R1) through (R5) together with Aristotelian Syllogism, Subsumption, and Conflict Detection. In accordance with Section 2.1, let L 0 be the minimal sublanguage of L consisting of all formulas that can be built up from the atomic formula ⊥, and let B 0 = ∅. In addition, let G 0 = ∅.
For the controller, all inputs by human users must be formulas having one of the following forms: (i) α(a); (ii) (∀x)(α(x) → β(x)), where α and β are distinct; and (iii) (∀x)¬(α(x) ∧ β(x)), where α and β are distinct. As mentioned, part of the function of the controller is to maintain the graphs that are represented in the derivation path by the G t . These graphs have two types of nodes: one type representing documents corresponding to individual constant symbols and one type representing classification categories corresponding to unary predicate symbols. There are three kinds of links: is-an-element-of links from documents to categories, is-a-subclass-of links between categories, and are-disjoint links between categories. It is desired that the controller maintain these graphs, ignoring are-disjoint links, as DAGs without redundant links, as described in the foregoing.
To complete the specification of the controller, it is necessary to provide algorithms that will be executed depending on the type of user input. In the present system, it is convenient to distinguish between two kinds of input event: the first being when a formula is provided to the controller by a human user and the second being when a formula is provided to the controller as the result of an inference rule application. The following describes algorithms associated with five such event types. Of these, Event Types 1, 4, and 5 correspond to user inputs. These are initiating events, each of which may lead to a sequence of events of some of the other types.
In all events, it is assumed that if the formula provided to the controller already exists and is active in the current belief set, its input is immediately rejected. This prevents unnecessary duplicates. In each of the following, assume that the most recent entry into the derivation path is (L t , B t , G t ).
Event Type 1. A formula of the form α(a) is provided to the controller by a human user. If either α or a is not in the symbol set for L t , form L t+1 by adding the missing ones to the symbol set for L t ; otherwise, set L t+1 = L t . Form B t+1 from B t by adding the labeled formula (α(a), {t + 1, {hu}, ∅, bel, 0.5, a posteriori}). If there are no nodes representing either a or α in G t , form G t+1 by adding such nodes together with an is-an-element-of link from the a node to the α node. If one of a and α is represented by a node in G t but the other is not, form G t+1 by adding a node representing the one that is missing together with an is-an-element-of link from the a node to the α node. Note that if a category node is being added, this will become a root node. If both a and α are represented by nodes in G t , form G t+1 by adding an is-an-element-of link from the a node to the α node, unless this would create a redundant path in the graph.
Search B t+1 for active formulas of the forms (∀x)¬(α(x) ∧ β(x)) or (∀x)¬(β(x) ∧ α(x)), where α is the predicate symbol of the input formula and β is some predicate symbol other than α, and if found, search for an active occurrence of β(a), where a is the individual constant of the input formula, and for each successful such search, apply Conflict Detection to infer ⊥ and provide this formula to the controller. This is an event of Type 2.
Let B t * be the most recent belief set, that is, either it is B t+1 or it is the belief set that has resulted from the processes associated with the indicated events of Type 2, if any occurred. If the input formula α(a) is still active, search B t * for any active formulas having the form (∀x)(α(x) → β(x)), where α is the predicate symbol of the input formula. For each such formula, apply Aristotelian Syllogism to this and the formula α(a) to infer β(a), and provide this formula to the controller. This is an event of Type 3.
Event Type 2. The formula ⊥ is provided to the controller as the result of an application of Conflict Detection. Let L t+1 = L t . Form B t+1 from B t by (i) adding the labeled formula (⊥, {t + 1, F, ∅, bel, 0.5, a posteriori}), where the from-list F contains the name of the inference rule (Conflict Detection) that was used to conclude this occurrence of ⊥, together with the indexes of the formulas that served as premises in the rule application, and (ii) updating the to-lists of all formulas that thus served as premises by including the index t + 1. Let G t+1 = G t . Now invoke the Dialectical Belief Revision algorithm on B t+1 as described in Section 2.2, starting with the formula ⊥ just added to the belief set. As a result of this process, some formulas in the current belief set will have their status changed from bel to disbel. Let B t+2 be the belief set obtained from B t+1 by making these changes in the relevant formulas' labels. Let L t+2 = L t+1 . Obtain G t+2 from G t+1 by removing any elements representing formulas whose statuses have thus been changed to disbel. Specifically, (i) if a formula of the form α(a) is disbelieved, remove the is-an-element-of link connecting the node representing a to the node representing α, and remove the node representing a, unless it is connected to some node other than the one representing α, and (ii) if a formula of the form (∀x)(α(x) → β(x)) is disbelieved, remove the is-a-subclass-of link connecting the node representing α to the node representing β, and remove the node representing α, unless it is connected to some node other than the one representing β.
Event Type 3. A formula of the form α(a)
is provided to the controller as a result of an inference rule application (Aristotelian Syllogism). In this case, both α and a are already in L t , so let L t+1 = L t . Form B t+1 from B t by (i) adding the labeled formula (α(a), {t + 1, F, ∅, bel, 0.5, a posteriori}), where the from-list F contains the name of the inference rule that was used to infer α(a) (Aristotelian Syllogism), together with the indexes of the formulas that served as premises in the rule application, and (ii) updating the to-lists of all formulas that thus served as premises by including the index t + 1. Let G t+1 = G t . Note that no modification of the graph is warranted, as the membership of the document associated with a in the category associated with α is already implicit in the graph so that a link between the respective nodes would form a redundant path.
Let B t * be the most recent belief set, that is, instance, either it is B t+1 or it is the belief set that has resulted from the processes associated with the indicated events of Type 2, if any occurred. If the input formula α(a) is still active, search B t * for any active formulas having the form (∀x)(α(x) → β(x)), where α is the predicate symbol of the input formula. For each such formula, apply Aristotelian Syllogism to this and the formula α(a) to infer β(a), and provide this formula to the controller. This is a recursive occurrence of an event of Type 3.
Event Type 4.
A formula of the form (∀x)(α(x) → β(x)) is provided to the controller by a human user. If both α and β are already in L t , begin by performing as many as possible of the following three actions. First, search B t to determine if either of the formulas (∀x)¬(α(x) ∧ β(x)) and (∀x)¬(β(x) ∧ α(x)) are active, and if so, reject the input and inform the user that the input is disallowed inasmuch as it contradicts the current belief set. Second, explore all ancestors of α to see if they include β, and if so, reject the input and inform the user that the input is disallowed inasmuch as it would create a redundant path in the subsumption hierarchy. Third, explore all ancestors of β as expressed by formulas in B t to determine whether these include α, and if so, reject the input and inform the user that the input is disallowed inasmuch as it would create a loop in the subsumption hierarchy. If the input is not rejected for any of these reasons, do the following.
If either α or β is not in the symbol set for L t , form L t+1 by adding the ones that are missing; otherwise, let L t+1 = L t . Form B t+1 from B t by adding the labeled formula ((∀x)(α(x) → β(x)), {t + 1, {hu}, ∅, bel, 0.5, a posteriori}). If there are no nodes representing either α or β in G t , form G t+1 by adding such nodes together with an is-a-subclass-of link from the α node to the β node. If one of α and β is represented by a node in G t but the other is not, form G t+1 by adding a node representing the one that is missing together with an is-a-subclass-of link from the α node to the β node. If both α and β are represented by nodes in G t , form G t+1 by adding an is-a-subclass-of link from the α node to the β node. Now search B t+1 for any active formulas of the form α(a) where α is the predicate symbol in the input formula, and for each such formula, apply Aristotelian Syllogism to infer β(a), and provide this to the controller. This is an event of Type 3.
Event Type 5.
A formula of the form (∀x)(¬(α(x) ∧ β(x))) is provided to the controller by a user. If either α or β is not in the symbol set for L t , form L t+1 by adding the ones that are missing; otherwise, let L t+1 = L t . Form B t+1 from B t by adding the labeled formula ((∀x)(¬(α(x) ∧ β(x))), {t + 1, {hu}, ∅, bel, 0.5, a posteriori}). If there are no nodes representing either α or β in G t , form G t+1 by adding such nodes together with an are-disjoint link between the two nodes. If one of α and β is represented by a node in G t but the other is not, form G t+1 by adding a node representing the one that is missing together with an are-disjoint link between the two nodes. If both α and β are represented by nodes in G t , then form G t+1 by adding an are-disjoint link between the two nodes.
Having accomplished this, search B t+1 for active formulas of the forms α(a) and β(a), and if found, apply Conflict Detection to infer the formula ⊥ and provide this to the controller. This is an event of Type 2.
It may be noted that the foregoing does not provide for the user's removing links from the graph, or more exactly, changing the status of an extralogical axiom from bel to disbel. An ability to do so would obviously be desirable in any practical application. In particular, if the user wished to modify the graph by inserting a new category represented by γ between two existing categories represented by α and β, one would need to remove the link between (the categories represented by) α and β, and then add a link from α to γ and a link from γ to β. It is not difficult to see that removing a link can be handled in a straightforward manner simply by following to-lists starting with the formula (∀x)(α(x) → β(x)) representing the link between α and β and changing all formulas whose derivations relied on that formula to disbel. In effect, this undoes the event of adding the link in question, as well as any further additions to the belief set that may have been based on the presence of the link.
Note also that none of the given events employ the Subsumption rule. This is because in the present example, information regarding subsumption among the categories was not included as part of the salient information. Such could be added to a future example, but this would make the associated algorithms more complex.
PROPOSITION 4.1. The DMA is a normal DRS.
Illustration
The application of the algorithms associated with the foregoing events can be illustrated by considering the inputs needed to create the concept taxonomy shown in Figure 3 . Let us abbreviate TheLibrary, Science, Engineering, Humanities, ComputerScience, Philosophy, and ArtificialIntelligence as TL, S, E, H, CS, P, and AI, respectively. In accordance with the definition of derivation path in Section 2.1, the language L 0 will be the language generated by the logical symbols given in Section 3.1 (i.e., by σ 0 = {x 1 , x 2 , . . . , ',', '(', ')', ¬, ∨, ∀, ⊥}). This means that the only formula in L 0 is ⊥. Also in accordance with the Section 2.1, belief set B 0 = ∅. In accordance with the definition of the DMA, set G 0 = ∅.
Consider an input of the first formula in the foregoing list, namely (∀x)(S(x) → TL(x)). This is an event of Type 4. The language L 1 is formed from L 0 by adding the symbols S and TL (or more exactly, the predicate letters A 1 2 and A 1 1 ), that is, σ 1 = σ 0 ∪ {S, TL}. The belief set B 1 is formed from B 0 by adding the labeled formula ((∀x)(S(x) → TL(x)), {1, {hu}, ∅, bel, 0.5, a posteriori}). The graph G 1 is formed from G 0 by adding the vertices TL, S and the edge (link) (S, TL) .
The inputs of the next six formulas in the foregoing list are all handled similarly, each comprising an event of Type 4. This leads to a language L 7 generated by symbol set σ 7 = σ 0 ∪ {TL, S, E, H, CS, P, AI}. Belief set B 7 will consist of the seven indicated labeled formulas with indexes (timestamps) 1 through 7. Graph G 7 will consist of the vertices TL, S, E, H, CS, P, AI and the seven is-a-subclass-of links shown in Figure 3 .
Input of (∀x)¬(E(x) ∧ H(x)) is an event of Type 5. This gives L 8 = L 7 , B 8 is formed from B 7 by adding the given input formula together with a label having index 8, and G 8 is formed from G 7 by adding the are-disjoint edge (E, H).
Consider input of the formula S(Doc1). This is an event of Type 1. This gives symbol set σ 9 = σ 8 ∪{Doc1}, the belief set B 9 is formed from B 8 by adding the input formula with a label having index 9, and graph G 9 is obtained from G 8 by adding the is-an-elementof edge (Doc1, S). The algorithm for Event Type 1 then proceeds to apply Aristotelian Syllogism to the input formula and the formula (∀x)(S(x) → TL(x)) that was input in step 1 (counting B 0 as step 0). This derives the formula TL(Doc1) and provides this formula to the controller. This is an event of Type 3. The effect of the algorithm for this event type is that L 10 = L 9 , G 10 = G 9 , and B 10 is formed from B 9 by adding the newly derived formula with a label having index 10. In addition, the from-list in the label for the derived formula is set to {AristotelianSyllogism, 9, 1}, and the to-lists in the label for formulas with indexes 9 and 1 are set to {10}. For brevity in the following, assume that similar updatings of from-lists and to-lists are performed as appropriate in accordance with the definitions in Section 2.1. Note that a from-list will refer to at most one inference rule and set of premises, whereas a to-list may contain indexes of any number of derived conclusions.
Consider input of the formula E(Doc1). This is an event of Type 1. This gives L 11 = L 10 , B 11 is formed from B 10 by adding the input formula with a label having index 11, and G 11 is formed from G 10 by adding the edge (Doc1, E). The algorithm for Event Type 1 then proceeds to apply Aristotelian Syllogism to this formula and the formula (∀x)(E(x) → TH(x)) that was input in step 2. This derives the formula TL(Doc1) and provides this formula to the controller. This is an event of Type 3. Since the formula TL(Doc1) is already in the belief set, the rule that duplicates are forbidden is invoked and the algorithm for Event Type 3 is not invoked.
Consider input of the formula AI(Doc2). This is an event of Type 1. This gives symbol set σ 12 = σ 11 ∪ {Doc2}, the belief set B 12 is formed from B 11 by adding the input formula with a label having index 12, and graph G 12 is obtained from G 11 by adding the is-an-element-of edge (Doc2, AI). The algorithm for Event Type 1 then proceeds to apply Aristotelian Syllogism to this formula and the formula (∀x)(AI(x) → CS(x)) that was input in step 7. This derives the formula CS(Doc2) and provides this formula to the controller. This is an event of Type 3. The algorithm for Type 3 is invoked, giving L 13 = L 12 , B 13 is formed from B 12 by adding the derived formula with a label having index 13, and G 13 = G 12 . Then, continuing with the algorithm for Event Type 3, Aristotelian Syllogism is applied to this formula and the formula (∀x)(CS(x) → S(x)) that was input in step 4. This derives the formula S(Doc2) and provides this formula to the controller. This is a recursive invocation of Event Type 3 leading to L 14 = L 13 , B 14 is formed from B 13 by adding the derived formula with a label having index 14, and G 14 = G 13 . Then, continuing with the algorithm for Event Type 3, Aristotelian Syllogism is applied to this formula and the formula (∀x)(S(x) → TL(x)) that was input in step 4 (as this is the next formula in the belief set to which the inference rule can be applied). This derives the formula TL(Doc2) and provides this formula to the controller, which is another event of Type 3. The algorithm for this event type yields L 15 = L 14 , B 15 is formed from B 14 by adding the derived formula with a label having index 15, and G 15 = G 14 . Since there are no opportunities to apply Aristotelian Syllogism with this formula, the recursion now backtracks to the first invocation of Event Type 3, as there is another opportunity to apply Aristotelian Syllogism at that point, this time to the derived formula CS(Doc2) and the formula (∀x)(CS(x) → E(x)) that was input in step 5. The algorithm proceeds similarly to the foregoing, giving L 16 = L 15 , B 16 is formed from B 15 by adding the formula E(Doc2) with a label having index 16, G 16 = G 15 , and then Aristotelian Syllogism is applied deriving TL(Doc2), giving an event of Type 3 whose algorithm is not invoked because of the rule forbidding duplicates in the belief set.
Consider input of the formula P(Doc3). This is an event of Type 1. Similarly to the foregoing, this gives symbol set σ 17 = σ 16 ∪ {Doc3}, B 17 is formed from B 16 by adding the input formula with a label having index 17, and G 17 is formed from G 16 by adding the edge (Doc3, P). The algorithm for Event Type 1 then proceeds to apply Aristotelian Syllogism to this formula and the formula (∀x)(P(x) → H(x)) that was input in step 6. This derives the formula H(Doc3) and provides this formula to the controller. This is an event of Type 3. The algorithm for Type 3 is invoked, giving L 18 = L 17 , B 18 is formed from B 17 by adding the derived formula with a label having index 18, and G 18 = G 17 . Then, continuing with the algorithm for Event Type 3, Aristotelian Syllogism is applied to this formula and the formula (∀x)(H(x) → TL(x)) that was input in step 3. This derives the formula LT(Doc2) and provides this formula to the controller, which is another event of Type 3. The algorithm for this event type yields L 19 = L 18 , B 19 is formed from B 18 by adding the derived formula with a label having index 19, and G 19 = G 18 . Since there are no opportunities to apply Aristotelian Syllogism with this formula, the algorithm terminates.
This completes the construction of the taxonomy in Figure 3 . At this point, the language L 19 is the one generated by symbol set σ 19 = σ 0 ∪ {TL, S, E, H, CS, P, AI, Doc1, Doc2, Doc3}, the belief set B 19 consists of the labeled formulas described in the foregoing listed in the order of their indexes 1 through 19, and G 19 consists of the nodes and edges shown in Figure 3 . Note that at each timestep t, the belief set B t contains all formulas of the form α(a) that are implicit in the graph G t . Now suppose that the user inputs CS(Doc3). This is an event of Type 1. Since both CS and Doc3 are in the current symbol set, this gives L 20 = L 19 , B 20 is formed from B 19 by adding the input formula with a label having index 20, and G 20 is formed from G 19 by adding the edge (Doc3, CS). The algorithm for Event Type 1 then proceeds to apply Aristotelian Syllogism to this formula and the formula (∀x)(CS(x) → S(x)) that was input in step 4. This derives the formula S(Doc3) and provides this formula to the controller. This is an event of Type 3. The algorithm for Type 3 is invoked, giving L 21 = L 20 , B 21 is formed from B 20 by adding the derived formula with a label having index 21, and G 21 = G 20 . Then, continuing with the algorithm for Event Type 3, Aristotelian Syllogism is applied to this formula and the formula (∀x)(S(x) → TL(x)) that was input in step 1. This derives the formula TL(Doc3) and provides this formula to the controller. This is a recursive invocation of Event Type 3 leading to L 22 = L 21 , B 22 is formed from B 21 by adding the derived formula with a label having index 22, and G 22 = G 21 . Since there are no further opportunities to apply Aristotelian Syllogism, the recursion backtracks and then continues with the next opportunity to apply Aristotelian Syllogism on the previous invocation of Event Type 3, namely it applies the rule to CS(Doc3) and the formula (∀x)(CS(x) → E(x)), which was input in step 5. This derives the formula E(Doc3) and provides this formula to the controller. This is an event of Type 3. The algorithm for Type 3 is invoked, giving L 23 = L 22 , B 23 is formed from B 22 by adding the derived formula with a label having index 23, and G 23 = G 22 . Then, continuing with the algorithm for Event Type 3, it moves on to the phase where it searches for formulas comprising a conflict. (Note that this phase was also required in all of the foregoing occurrences of Event Type 3, but for brevity, this was not mentioned, as there would have been no conflict to detect.) A conflict arises from the formula E(Doc3) just derived, the formula H(Doc3) entered in step 18, and the formula (∀x)¬(E(x) ∧ H(x)) input in step 8. Then Conflict Detection is applied to infer ⊥, and this is provided to the controller. This is an event of Type 2, giving L 24 = L 23 , B 24 is formed from B 23 by adding the input formula with a label having index 24, and G 24 = G 23 . Then Dialectical Belief Revision is invoked. To-lists of the premises in the application of Conflict Detection are explored, leading backward through the derivations to the extralogical axioms (∀x)¬(E(x)∧H(x)), (∀x)(CS(x) → E(x)), CS(Doc3), (∀x)(P(x) → H(x)), and P(Doc3).
Let us suppose that the user decides to resolve the conflict by changing the status of CS(Doc3) to disbel. Then, starting with this formula, to-lists are followed and the statuses of the derived formulas are changed to disbel. In order, these are S(Doc3), TL(Doc3), E(Doc3), and ⊥. This effectively restores the language, belief set, and graph to the state they were in before the formula CS(Doc3) was input. More exactly, L 25 = L 24 (which = L 19 ), B 25 is obtained from B 24 by making the indicated status changes so that the active formulas are just the ones in B 19 , and G 25 = G 24 (which = G 19 ).
The user could have alternatively chosen to disbelieve one of the other discovered extralogical axioms. For example, suppose that (∀x)(CS(x) → E(x)) is chosen. In step 16, this formula was used together with CS(Doc2) to infer E(Doc2), and in step 23, this formula was used together with CS(Doc3) to infer E(Doc3) (so the to-list for this formula is {16, 23}). Accordingly, Dialectical Belief Revision proceeds to change the status of both of these derived formulas to disbel, and then, as in the foregoing, changing the status of the derived ⊥. Moreover, the is-a-subset-of link from CS to E is removed from the graph. Thus, in this case, L 25 = L 24 , B 25 is obtained from B 24 by making the indicated status changes, and G 25 is obtained from G 24 by removing the indicated edge. This result is different than the one in the foregoing, but the belief set is nonetheless consistent.
As can be seen, the algorithms provided here are completely finitary, and they are sufficiently precisely defined that it is clear that they can be implemented on a conventional computer. To reach this point was the primary goal of the present research. Moreover, the given example helps to show that the algorithms have the desired effect, namely (i) the graph is maintained in the proper form as a DAG without redundant links; (ii) all formulas of the form α(a) implicit in the graph are derived and entered into the belief set; and (iii) whenever a triggered algorithm terminates, the belief set is consistent (even though it might not have been during the algorithm's processing). That this will always be the case is established in Sections 4.3 and 4.4.
Saliency
That the DMA controller produces all relevant salient information as prescribed in the foregoing can be summarized as a pair of theorems.
THEOREM 4.1. The foregoing algorithms serve to maintain the graph, ignoring aredisjoint links, as a DAG without redundant links.
Thus, leaf nodes will be either documents or empty classification categories; if a document is linked to some category, it is not directly linked to any ancestors of that category, and no category is directly linked to any of its ancestors other than its parents. This makes the graph useful for visualization and browsing.
In addition, the algorithms ensure that the belief set will contain explicit representation of all and only the document-category classifications implicit in the graph. This amounts to the following. THEOREM 4.2. After any process initiated by a user input terminates, the resulting belief set will contain a formula of the form α(a) if and only if the formula is derivable from the formulas corresponding to links in the graph.
Correctness
From an intuitive standpoint, there are good reasons to believe that the given algorithms should serve to preserve the consistency of the belief set for a DMA. These reasons are as follows: (i) it seems evident that the only way it is possible for an inconsistency to arise is if there occurs a formula of the form (∀x)¬(α(x) ∧ β(x)) together with formulas of the form α(a) and β(a); (ii) the foregoing Theorem 6 guarantees that this can be determined simply by scanning the (finite) contents of the belief set; and (iii) the presence of such formulas automatically triggers an application of Dialectical Belief Revision, in which the offending conflict is removed. By definition, however, consistency requires that there be no formula P such that both P and ¬P are formally derivable in the first-order theory that has the active members of the belief set as its extralogical axioms, and this is not explicitly guaranteed by these reasons. Moreover, there evidently is no straightforward proof-theoretic argument that will guarantee this. These considerations motivate the following model-theoretic argument. THEOREM 4.3. For any derivation path in the DMA, the belief set that results at the conclusion of a process initiated by a user input will be consistent.
The main objective of Schwartz [1997] was to show how a DRS framework could be used to formulate reasoning about property inheritance with exceptions, where the underlying logic was a probabilistic "logic of qualified syllogisms." This work was inspired in part by the frame-based systems due to Minsky [1975] and constitutes an alternative formulation of the underlying logic (e.g., as discussed by Hayes [1980] ).
What was missing in Schwartz [1997] was the notion of a controller. There, a reasoning system was presented and shown to provide intuitively plausible solutions to numerous "puzzles" that had previously appeared in the literature on nonmonotonic reasoning (e.g., Opus the Penguin [Touretzky 1984 ], Nixon Diamond [Touretzky et al. 1987] , and Clyde the Elephant [Touretzky et al. 1987] ). But there was nothing to guide the reasoning processes-no means for providing a sense of purpose for the reasoning agent. The present work fills this gap by adding a controller similar to the one described for the DMA. Moreover, it deals with a simpler system based on first-order logic and reserves further exploitation of the logic of qualified syllogisms for a later work. The kind of DRS developed in this section will be termed a multiple inheritance system (MIS).
For this application, the language L given in Section 3.1 is expanded by including some typed predicate symbols, namely some unary predicate symbols A (k) 1 , A (k) 2 , . . . representing kinds of things (any objects), and some unary predicate symbols A
representing properties of things. The superscripts k and p are also applied to generic denotations. Thus, an expression of the form (∀x)(α (k) (x) → β ( p) (x)) represents the proposition that all αs have property β. These new predicate symbols are used here purely as syntactical items for purposes of defining an extralogical "specificity principle" and some associated extralogical graphical structures and algorithms. Semantically, they are treated exactly the same as other predicate symbols.
A multiple-inheritance hierarchy H will be a directed graph consisting of a set of nodes together with a set of links represented as ordered pairs of nodes. Nodes may be either object nodes, kind nodes, or property nodes. A link of the form (object node, kind node) will be an object-kind link, one of the form (kind node, kind node) will be a subkind-kind link, and one of the form (kind node, property node) will be a hasproperty link. There will be no other types of links. Object nodes will be labeled with (represent) individual constant symbols, kind nodes will be labeled with (represent) kind-type unary predicate symbols, and property nodes will be labeled with (represent) property-type unary predicate symbols or negations of such symbols. In addition, each property type predicate symbol will bear a numerical subscript, called an occurrence index, indicating an occurrence of that symbol in a given hierarchy H. These indexes are used to distinguish different occurrences of the same property-type symbol in H. An object-kind link between an individual constant symbol a and a predicate symbol α (k) will represent the formula α (k) (a), a subkind-kind link between a predicate symbol α (k) and a predicate symbol β (k) will represent the formula (∀x)(α (k) (x) → β (k) (x)), and a has-property link between a predicate symbol α (k) and a predicate symbol β ( p) 1 will represent the formula (∀x)(α (k) (x) → β ( p) 1 (x)). Given such an H, there is defined on the object nodes and the kind nodes a specificity relation > s (read "more specific than") according to the following: (i) if (node 1 , node 2 ) is either an object-kind link or a kind-kind link, then node 1 > s node 2 , and (ii) if node 1 > s node 2 and node 2 > s node 3 , then node 1 > s node 3 . We shall also have a dual generality relation > g (read "more general than") defined by node 1 > g node 2 if and only if node 1 < s node 2 . It follows that object nodes are maximally specific and minimally general. It also follows that H may have any number of maximally general nodes, and in fact that it need not be connected. A maximally general node is a root node. A path in a hierarchy H (not to be confused with the path in a path logic) will be a sequence node 1 , . . . , node n wherein node 1 is a root node, and for each i = 1, . . . , n − 2, the pair (node i+1 , node i ) is a subkind-kind link, and the pair (node n , node n−1 ) is either a subkind-kind link or an object-kind link. Note that property nodes do not participate in paths as here defined.
Similarly as with the graphs used in the DMA, it is desired to organize a multiple inheritance hierarchy as a DAG without redundant links with respect to the object-kind and subkind-kind links (i.e., here ignoring has-property links), where, as before, by a redundant link is meant a direct link from some node to an ancestor of that node other than the node's immediate ancestors (i.e., other than its parents). More exactly, two distinct paths will form a redundant pair if they have some node in common beyond the first place where they differ. This means that they comprise two distinct paths to the common node(s). A path will be simply redundant (or redundant in H) if it is a member of a redundant pair. As before, a path contains a loop if it has more than one occurrence of the same node. Provisions are made in the following to ensure that hierarchies with loops or redundant paths are not allowed. As is customary, the hierarchies will be drawn with the upward direction being from more specific to less (less general to more) so that roots appear at the top and objects appear at the bottom. Kind-property links will extend horizontally from their associated kind nodes.
In terms of the foregoing specificity relation on H, we can assign an address to each object and kind node in the following manner. Let the addresses of the root nodes, in any order, be (1), (2), (3), . . .. Then for the node with address (1), say, let the next most specific nodes in any order have the addresses (1, 1), (1, 2), (1, 3) , . . .; let the nodes next most specific to the one with address (1, 1) have addresses (1, 1, 1), (1, 1, 2), (1, 1, 3) , . . .; and so on. Thus, an address indicates the node's position in the hierarchy relative to some root node. Inasmuch as an object or kind node may be more specific than several different root nodes, the same node may have more than one such address. Note that the successive initial segments of an address are the addresses of the nodes appearing in the path from the related root node to the node having that initial segment as its address. Let > denote the usual lexicographic order on addresses. We shall also apply > to the nodes having those addresses. It is easily verified that node 1 > node 2 if and only if node 1 > s node 2 . For object and kind nodes, we shall use the term specificity rank (or just rank) synonymously with "address."
Since, as mentioned, it is possible for any given object or kind node to have more than one address, it thus can have more than one rank. Two nodes are comparable with respect to the specificity relation > s , however, only if they appear on the same path, that is, only if one node is an ancestor of the other, in which case only the rank each has acquired due to its being on that path will apply. Therefore, if two nodes are comparable with respect to their ranks by the relation >, there is no ambiguity regarding the ranks being compared.
Having thus defined specificity ranks for object and kind nodes, let us agree that each property node inherits the rank of the kind node to which it is linked. Therefore, for property nodes, the rank is not an address.
An example of such a hierarchy is shown in Figure 4 . Here, Tweety and Opus may be taken as names for the individual constants a 1 and a 2 , and Bird (k) , Penguin (k) , and CanFly ( p) can be taken as names for the unary predicate symbols A (k) 1 , A (k) 2 , and A ( p) 1 , respectively. (Note: The superscripts are retained on the names only to visually identify the types of the predicate symbols and could be dropped without altering the meanings.) The links represent the following formulas:
(∀x)(Penguin (k) (x) → Bird (k) (x)) (∀x)(Bird (k) (x) → CanFly (∀x)(Penguin (k) (x) → ¬CanFly ( p) 2 (x)) Bird (k) (Tweety) Penquin (k) (Opus).
The subscripts 1 and 2 on the predicate symbol CanFly ( p) in the graph distinguish the different occurrences of this symbol in the graph, and the same subscripts on the symbol occurrences in the formulas serve to correlate these with their occurrences in the graph. Note that these are just separate occurrences of the same symbol, however, and therefore have identical semantic interpretations. Formally, CanFly Figure 4 reveals the rationale for the present notion of multiple-inheritance hierarchy. The intended interpretation of the graph is that element nodes and kind nodes inherit the properties of their parents, with the exception that more specific property nodes take priority and block inheritances from those that are less specific. Let us refer to this as the specificity principle. In accordance with this principle, in Figure 4 , Tweety inherits the property CanFly from Bird, but Opus does not inherit this property because the inheritance is blocked by the more specific information that Opus is a Penguin and Penguins cannot fly. Figure 4 constitutes a rethinking of the well-known example of Opus the Penguin depicted in Figure 5 (adapted from Touretzky [1984] ). The latter is problematic in that by one reasoning path one can conclude that Opus is a flier, and by another reasoning path that he is not. This same contradiction is implicit in the formulas introduced in the foregoing, since if one were to apply the axioms and rules of first-order logic as given in Section 3, one could derive both CanFly ( p) (Opus) and ¬CanFly ( p) (Opus), in which case the system would be inconsistent.
Formal Specification of an Arbitrary Multiple Inheritance System
We are now in a position to define the desired kind of DRS. For the path logic, let the language be the one described in the foregoing, obtained from the L of Section 3.1 by adjoining the additional unary kind-type and property-type predicate symbols, let the axiom schemas be (S1) through (S6), and let the inference rules be (R1) through (R5) together with Aristotelian Syllogism and Contradiction Detection. Thus, the path logic component of an MIS is essentially identical to that of a DMA, the only exception being that we here use Contradiction Detection instead of Conflict Detection. In addition, the Subsumption rule is omitted here, since as with the DMA as described in Section 4, this rule is not required. It follows that all results of Section 3 will apply. Similarly with the DMA, derivation paths will consist of triples (L t , B t , H t ), where these components respectively are the (sub)language (of L), belief set, and multiple inheritance hierarchy at time t. In accordance with Section 2.1, let L 0 be the minimal sublanguage of L consisting of all formulas that can be built up from the atomic formula ⊥, and let B 0 = ∅. In addition, let H 0 = ∅.
The controller for an MIS is defined analogously with that for the DMA but differs in several important respects. In particular, the MIS controller is designed to enforce the foregoing specificity principle. It may also be noted that this rendition of the MIS does not allow one to express that two kind categories are disjoint (although this could be included if desired) so that the source of contradictory formulas that was inherent in the DMA is not present here. Nonetheless, contradictions can arise in an MIS that has inherently contradictory root nodes in its multiple inheritance hierarchy. An example of this (the famous Nixon Diamond [Touretzky et al. 1987] ) will be discussed. The purpose of the MIS controller will be essentially the same as for the DMA controller, namely (i) to derive and enter into the belief set all object classification implicit in the multiple inheritance hierarchy, that is, all formulas of the form α (k) (a) that can be derived from formulas describing the hierarchy (while observing the specificity principle) and (ii) to ensure that the belief set remains consistent. Item (i) thus defines what will be considered the salient information for an MIS. Also similarly with the DMA, the MIS controller is intended to maintain the multiple inheritance hierarchy as a DAG without redundant paths, only here with respect to just the object and kind nodes. Formulas that can be input by the users may have one of the forms (i) α (k) (a), (ii) (∀x)(α (k) 
. Again it will be agreed that the epistemic entrenchment value for all input formulas is 0.5.
We may now define some algorithms that are to be executed in response to each type of user input. There will be eight types of events. Event Types 1, 6, 7, and 8 correspond to user inputs, and the others occur as the result of rule applications. As before, in all such events, it is assumed that if the formula provided to the controller already exists and is active in the current belief set, its input is immediately rejected. In each event, assume that the most recent entry into the derivation path is (L t , B t , H t ).
Event Type 1. A formula of the form α (k) (a) is provided to the controller by a human user. If either α (k) or a is not in the symbol set for L t , form L t+1 by adding the missing ones to the symbol set for L t ; otherwise, set L t+1 = L t . Form B t+1 from B t by adding the labeled formula (α (k) (a), {t + 1, {hu}, ∅, bel, 0.5, a posteriori}). If there are no nodes representing either a or α (k) in H t , form H t+1 by adding such nodes together with an object-kind link from the a node to the α (k) node. If one of a and α (k) is represented by a node in H t but the other is not, form H t+1 by adding a node representing the one that is missing together with an object-kind link from the a node to the α (k) node. Note that if a kind node is being added, this will become a root node. If both a and α (k) are represented by nodes in G t , form G t+1 by adding an object-kind link from the a node to the α (k) node, unless this would create a redundant path.
Search B t+1 for any active formulas having the form (∀x)(α (k) (x) → β (k) (x)), where α is the predicate symbol of the input formula. For each such formula, apply Aristotelian Syllogism to this and the formula α (k) (a) to infer β (k) (a), and provide this formula to the controller. This is an event of Type 2.
Let B t * be the most recent belief set, that is, either it is B t+1 or it is the belief set that has resulted from the processes associated with the indicated events of Type 2, if any occurred. If the input formula α (k) (a) is still active, search B t * for any active formulas having the form (∀x)(α (k) (x) → β ( p) (x)), where α is the predicate symbol of the input formula. For each such formula, apply Aristotelian Syllogism to this and the formula α (k) (a) to infer β ( p) (a), and provide this formula to the controller. This is an event of Type 3.
Let B t * be the most recent belief set, that is either it is B t+1 or it is the belief set that has resulted from the processes associated with the indicated events of Type 2 and/or Type 3, if any occurred. If the input formula α (k) (a) is still active, search B t * for any active formulas having the form (∀x)(α (k) (x) → ¬β ( p) (x)), where α is the predicate symbol of the input formula. For each such formula, apply Aristotelian Syllogism to this and the formula α (k) (a) to infer ¬β ( p) (a), and provide this formula to the controller. This is an event of Type 4.
Event Type 2.
A formula of the form α (k) (a) is provided to the controller as a result of an inference rule application (Aristotelian Syllogism). In this case, both α (k) and a are already in L t , so let L t+1 = L t . Form B t+1 from B t by (i) adding the labeled formula (α (k) (a), {t + 1, F, ∅, bel, 0.5, a posteriori}), where the from-list F contains the name of the inference rule that was used to infer α (k) (a) (Aristotelian Syllogism), together with the indexes of the formulas that served as premises in the rule application, and (ii) updating the to-lists of all formulas that thus served as premises by including the index t + 1. Let H t+1 = H t . Note that no modification of the hierarchy is warranted, as the membership of the object associated with a in the category associated with α (k) is already implicit in the hierarchy so that a link between the respective nodes would form a redundant path.
Search B t+1 for any active formulas having the form (∀x)(α (k) (x) → β (k) (x)), where α (k) is the predicate symbol of the foregoing derived formula. For each such formula, apply Aristotelian Syllogism to this and the formula α (k) (a) to infer β (k) (a), and provide this formula to the controller. This is a recursive occurrence of an event of Type 2.
Let B t * be the most recent belief set, that is, either it is B t+1 or it is the belief set that has resulted from the processes associated with the indicated events of Type 3 and/or Type 4, if any occurred. If the input formula α (k) (a) is still active, search B t * for any active formulas having the form (∀x)(α (k) (x) → ¬β ( p) (x)), where α is the predicate symbol of the input formula. For each such formula, apply Aristotelian Syllogism to this and the formula α (k) (a) to infer ¬β ( p) (a), and provide this formula to the controller. This is an event of Type 4. Event Type 3. A formula of the form α ( p) (a) is provided to the controller as a result of an inference rule application (Aristotelian Syllogism). Search the current hierarchy H t for the most specific occurrence (relative to the given occurrence of α ( p) (a)) in a formula containing α ( p) (i.e., either it is an occurrence of α ( p) or of ¬α ( p) ). If this most specific occurrence is an occurrence of ¬α ( p) , let L t+1 = L t , B t+1 = B t , and H t+1 = H t . This amounts to invoking the specificity principle to block an inheritance. If this most specific occurrence is an occurrence of α ( p) (a), the formula being input already resides in the current belief set, and again one can let L t+1 = L t , B t+1 = B t , and H t+1 = H t . Otherwise, do the following. Let L t+1 = L t . Form B t+1 from B t by (i) adding the labeled formula (α ( p) (a), {t + 1, F, ∅, bel, 0.5, a posteriori}), where the from-list F contains the name of the inference rule that was used to infer α ( p) (a) (Aristotelian Syllogism), together with the indexes of the formulas that served as premises in the rule application, and (ii) updating the to-lists of all formulas that thus served as premises by including the index t + 1. Let H t+1 = H t .
Search B t+1 for an active occurrence of the formula ¬α ( p) (a), where α ( p) (a) is the input formula, and if found, apply Contradiction Detection to infer ⊥ and provide this formula to the controller. This is an event of Type 5. If α ( p) (a) is still active, repeat the foregoing. Keep doing this until either α ( p) (a) becomes inactive (disbelieved) or no further occurrences of ¬α ( p) (a) are found.
Event Type 4.
A formula of the form ¬α ( p) (a) is provided to the controller as a result of an inference rule application (Aristotelian Syllogism). Search the current hierarchy H t for the most specific occurrence (relative to the given occurrence of ¬α ( p) (a)) of a formula containing α ( p) (i.e., either it is an occurrence of α ( p) or of ¬α ( p) ). If this most specific occurrence is an occurrence of α ( p) , let L t+1 = L t , B t+1 = B t , and H t+1 = H t . This amounts to invoking the specificity principle to block an inheritance. If this most specific occurrence is an occurrence of ¬α ( p) , the formula being input already resides in the current belief set, and again one can let L t+1 = L t , B t+1 = B t , and H t+1 = H t . Otherwise, do the following. Let L t+1 = L t . Form B t+1 from B t by (i) adding the labeled formula (¬α ( p) (a), {t + 1, F, ∅, bel, 0.5, a posteriori}), where the from-list F contains the name of the inference rule that was used to infer ¬α ( p) (a) (Aristotelian Syllogism), together with the indexes of the formulas that served as premises in the rule application, and (ii) updating the to-lists of all formulas that thus served as premises by including the index t + 1. Let H t+1 = H t .
Search B t+1 for an active occurrence of the formula α ( p) (a), where ¬α ( p) (a) is the input formula, and if found, apply Contradiction Detection to infer ⊥ and provide this formula to the controller. This is an event of Type 5. If ¬α ( p) (a) is still active, repeat the foregoing. Keep doing this until either ¬α ( p) (a) becomes inactive (disbelieved) or no further occurrences of α ( p) (a) are found. Event Type 5. The formula ⊥ is provided to the controller as the result of an application of Contradiction Detection. Let L t+1 = L t . Form B t+1 from B t by (i) adding the labeled formula (⊥, {t+1, F, ∅, bel, 0.5, a posteriori}) , where the from-list F contains the name of the inference rule (Contradiction Detection) that was used to conclude this occurrence of ⊥, together with the indexes of the formulas that served as premises in the rule application, and (ii) updating the to-lists of all formulas that thus served as premises by including the index t + 1. Let H t+1 = H t . Now invoke the Dialectical Belief Revision algorithm on B t+1 as described in Section 2.2, starting with the formula ⊥ just added to the belief set. As a result of this process, some formulas in the current belief set will have their status changed from bel to disbel. Let B t+2 be the belief set obtained from B t+1 by making these changes in the relevant formulas' labels. Let L t+2 = L t+1 . Obtain H t+2 from H t+1 by removing any elements representing formulas whose statuses have thus been changed to disbel. Specifically, (i) if a formula of the form α (k) (a) is disbelieved, remove the object-kind link connecting the node representing a to the node representing α (k) , and remove the node representing a, unless it is connected to some node other than the one representing α (k) , and (ii) if a formula of the form (∀x)(α (k) (x) → β (k) (x)) is disbelieved, remove the subkind-kind link connecting the node representing α (k) to the node representing β (k) , and remove the node representing α (k) , unless it is connected to some node other than the one representing β (k) . Event Type 6. A formula of the form (∀x)(α (k) (x) → β (k) (x)) is provided to the controller by a human user. If both α (k) and β (k) are already in L t , begin by performing as many as possible of the following two actions. First, explore all ancestors of α (k) to see if they include β (k) , and if so, reject the input and inform the user that the input is disallowed inasmuch as it would create a redundant path in the subsumption hierarchy. Second, explore all ancestors of β (k) as expressed by formulas in B t to determine whether these include α (k) , and if so, reject the input and inform the user that the input is disallowed inasmuch as it would create a loop in the subsumption hierarchy. If the input is not rejected for either of these reasons, do the following.
If either α (k) or β (k) is not in the symbol set for L t , form L t+1 by adding the ones that are missing; otherwise, let L t+1 = L t . Form B t+1 from B t by adding the labeled formula ((∀x)(α (k) (x) → β (k) (x)), {t+1, {hu}, ∅, bel, 0.5, a posteriori}). If there are no nodes representing either α (k) or β (k) in H t , form H t+1 by adding such nodes together with a subkind-kind link from the α (k) node to the β (k) node. If one of α (k) and β (k) is represented by a node in H t but the other is not, form H t+1 by adding a node representing the one that is missing together with a subkind-kind link from the α (k) node to the β (k) node. If both α (k) and β (k) are represented by nodes in H t , form H t+1 by adding a subkind-kind link from the α (k) node to the β (k) node. Now search B t+1 for any active formulas of the form α (k) (a), where α (k) is the predicate symbol in the input formula, and for each such formula, apply Aristotelian Syllogism to infer β (k) (a), and provide this to the controller. This is an event of Type 2. Event Type 7. A formula of the form (∀x)(α (k) (x) → β ( p) (x)) is provided to the controller by a human user. If either α (k) or β ( p) is not in the symbol set for L t , form L t+1 by adding the ones that are missing; otherwise, let L t+1 = L t . Form B t+1 from B t by adding the labeled formula ((∀x)(α (k) (x) → β ( p) (x)), {t + 1, {hu}, ∅, bel, 0.5, a posteriori}). If the occurrence of β ( p) in this formula is the n-th occurrence of this predicate symbol in the current derivation path, affix this occurrence with the extralogical subscript n to serve as an occurrence index. If there are no nodes representing either α (k) or β ( p) in H t , form H t+1 by adding such nodes (including the occurrence index on β ( p) ) together with a has-property link from the α (k) node to the β ( p) node. If one of α (k) and β ( p) is represented by a node in H t but the other is not, form H t+1 by adding a node representing the one that is missing together with a has-property link from the α (k) node to the β ( p) node. If both α (k) and β ( p) are represented by nodes in H t , form H t+1 by adding a has-property link from the α (k) node to the β ( p) node. Now search B t+1 for any active formulas of the form α (k) (a), where α (k) is the predicate symbol in the input formula, and for each such formula, apply Aristotelian Syllogism to infer β ( p) (a), and provide this to the controller. This is an event of Type 3.
Event Type 8.
A formula of the form (∀x)(α (k) (x) → ¬β ( p) (x)) is provided to the controller by a human user. If either α (k) or β ( p) is not in the symbol set for L t , form L t+1 by adding the ones that are missing; otherwise, let L t+1 = L t . Form B t+1 from B t by adding the labeled formula ((∀x)(α (k) (x) → ¬β ( p) (x)), {t+1, {hu}, ∅, bel, 0.5, a posteriori}). If the occurrence of β ( p) in this formula is the n-th occurrence of this predicate symbol in the current derivation path, affix this occurrence with the extralogical subscript n to serve as an occurrence index. If there are no nodes representing either α (k) or ¬β ( p) in H t , form H t+1 by adding such nodes (including the occurrence index on β ( p) ) together with a has-property link from the α (k) node to the ¬β ( p) node. If one of α (k) and ¬β ( p) is represented by a node in H t but the other is not, form H t+1 by adding a node representing the one that is missing together with a has-property link from the α (k) node to the ¬β ( p) node. If both α (k) and ¬β ( p) are represented by nodes in H t , form H t+1 by adding a has-property link from the α (k) node to the ¬β ( p) node. Now search B t+1 for any active formulas of the form α (k) (a), where α (k) is the predicate symbol in the input formula, and for each such formula, apply Aristotelian Syllogism to infer ¬β ( p) (a), and provide this to the controller. This is an event of Type 4.
We now turn to the task of establishing saliency and correctness for an arbitrary MIS. This entails proving appropriate analogs of Proposition 4.1 and Theorems 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3.
PROPOSITION 5.1. Every MIS is a normal DRS.
Illustration 1
Some of the algorithms associated with the foregoing events can be illustrated by considering the inputs needed to create the inheritance hierarchy shown in Figure 4 . This focuses on the process of property inheritance with exceptions. Let us abbreviate Bird, Penguin, and CanFly as B, P, and CF, respectively. In accordance with the definition of derivation path in Section 2.1, the language L 0 will be the language generated by the logical symbols given in Section 3.1 (i.e., by σ 0 = {x 1 , x 2 , . . . , ',', '(', ')', ¬, ∨, ∀, ⊥}). This means that the only formula in L 0 is ⊥. Also in accordance with the Section 2.1, belief set B 0 = ∅. In accordance with the definition of an MIS, set H 0 = ∅.
Consider an input of the first formula in the foregoing list, namely (∀x)(P (k) (x) → B (k) (x)). This is an event of Type 6. The language L 1 is formed from L 0 by adding the symbols P (k) and B (k) (or more exactly, the predicate letters A (k) 2 and A (k) 1 ), that is,
The belief set B 1 is formed from B 0 by adding the labeled formula ((∀x)(P (k) (x) → B (k) (x)), {1, {hu}, ∅, bel, 0.5, a posteriori}). The hierarchy H 1 is formed from H 0 by adding the nodes P (k) , B (k) and the subkind-kind link (P (k) , B (k) ).
Consider an input of the second formula in the list, namely (∀x)(B (k) (x) → CF ( p) 1 (x)). This is an event of Type 7. The language L 2 is formed from L 1 by adding the symbol CF ( p) (or more exactly, the predicate letter A index on CF ( p) . The hierarchy H 2 is formed from H 1 by adding the node CF ( p) 1 and the has-property link (B (k) , CF ( p) 1 ) (again adding the extralogical subscript). Consider an input of (∀x) (P (k) 
2 (x)). This is an event of Type 8. The language L 3 is set equal to L 2 . The belief set B 3 is formed from B 2 by adding the labeled formula ((∀x) (P (k) {3, {hu}, ∅, bel, 0.5, a posteriori}) , including the extralogical occurrence on CF ( p) as before. The hierarchy H 3 is formed from H 2 by adding the node ¬CF 2 ). Consider an input of B (k) (Tweety). This is an event of Type 1. The language L 4 is formed from L 3 by adding the symbol Tweety (or more exactly, the individual constant a 1 ). The belief set B 4 is formed from B 3 by adding the labeled formula (B (k) (Tweety), {4, {hu}, ∅, bel, 0.5, a posteriori}). The hierarchy H 4 is formed from H 3 by adding the node Tweety and the object-kind link (Tweety, B (k) ). The algorithm for Event Type 1 then proceeds to apply Aristotelian Syllogism to B (k) (Tweety) and the previously input formula (∀x)(B (k) (x) → CF ( p) 1 (x)) to infer CF ( p) 1 (Tweety)) and provide this to the controller. This is an event of Type 3. The algorithm for Event Type 3 (i) sets L 5 = L 4 ; (ii) forms B 5 from B 4 by adding the labeled formula (CF Consider an input of P (k) (Opus). This is an event of Type 1. The language L 6 is formed from L 5 by adding the symbol Opus (or more exactly, the individual constant a 2 ). The belief set B 6 is formed from B 5 by adding the labeled formula (P (k) (Opus), {6, {hu}, ∅, bel, 0.5, a posteriori}) . The hierarchy H 6 is formed from H 5 by adding the node Opus and the object-kind link (Opus, P (k) ). The algorithm for Event Type 1 then proceeds to apply Aristotelian Syllogism to P (k) (Opus) and the previously input formula (∀x)(P (k) (x) → B (k) (x)) to infer B (k) (Opus)) and provide this to the controller. This is an event of Type 2. The algorithm for Event Type 2 (i) sets L 7 = L 6 ; (ii) forms B 7 from B 6 by adding the labeled formula (B (k) (Opus), {7, F, ∅, bel, 0.5, a posteriori}), where the from-list F = {AristotelianSyllogism, 6, 1}, and changes the to-lists of formulas 6 and 1 from ∅ to {7}; and (iii) sets H 7 = H 6 .
The algorithm for Event Type 2 then continues by applying Aristotelian Syllogism to the inferred formula B (k) (Opus) and the previously input formula (∀x)(B (k) (x) → CF ( p) 1 (x)) to infer CF ( p) 1 (Opus) and provides this formula to the controller. This is an event of Type 3. Since there is a more specific occurrence of CF in the formula ¬CF So far the process has invoked Event Type 1, which led to an invocation of Event Type 2, which led to an invocation of Event Type 3. The Event Type 3 algorithm has now terminated, which effectively has also terminated the Event Type 2 algorithm, sending the flow of control back to where it left off in the Event Type 1 algorithm. This algorithm then proceeds to apply Aristotelian Syllogism to the input formula P (k) (Opus) and the previously input formula (∀x)(B (k) (x) → ¬CF ( p) 2 (x)) to infer ¬CF ( p) 2 (Opus) and provide this formula to the controller. This is an event of Type 4. Because this formula contains the most specific occurrence of CF, the algorithm (i) sets L 9 = L 8 ; (ii) forms B 9 from B 8 by adding the labeled formula (¬CF Thus, it is seen that in this example, the algorithms serve to derive all salient information (i.e., all formulas of the forms α (k)(a) , α ( p)(a) , and α ( p)(a) that are implicit in the graph) while at the same time correctly enforcing the specificity principle.
Illustration 2
This considers the application of Contradiction Detection. The classic Nixon Diamond puzzle (cf. Touretzky et al. [1987] ) is shown in Figure 6 . Here a contradiction arises because, by the reasoning portrayed on the left side, Nixon is a pacifist, whereas by the reasoning portrayed on the right, he is not. The resolution of this puzzle in the context of an MIS can be described in terms of the multiple inheritance hierarchy shown in Figure 7 .
The links in Figure 7 represent the following formulas:
The action of the algorithms may be traced similarly as in Illustration 1. Let Quaker, Republican, and Pacifist denote the predicate symbols A (k) 1 , A (k) 2 and A
1 , and abbreviate these by Q, R, and P, respectively. Let Nixon denote the individual constant a 1 . In accordance with the definition of derivation path in Section 2.1, the language L 0 will be the language generated by the logical symbols given in Section 3. Dynamic Reasoning Systems 32:37 σ 0 = {x 1 , x 2 , . . . , ',', '(', ')', ¬, ∨, ∀, ⊥}). This means that the only formula in L 0 is ⊥. Also in accordance with the Section 2.1, belief set B 0 = ∅. In accordance with the definition of an MIS, set H 0 = ∅.
Consider an input of (∀x)(Q (k) (x) → P ( p) 1 (x)). This is an event of Type 7. The language L 1 is formed from L 0 by adding the symbols Q (k) and P ( p) (or more exactly, the predicate letters A (k) 1 and A {1, {hu}, ∅, bel, 0.5, a posteriori}) , here including the extralogical occurrence index on P ( p) . The hierarchy H 1 is formed from H 0 by adding the nodes Q (k) 1 and P ( p) 1 and the has-property link (Q (k) , P ( p) 1 ). Consider an input of (∀x)(R (k) (x) → ¬P ( p) 1 (x)). This is an event of Type 8. The language L 2 is formed from L 1 by adding the symbol R (k) (or more exactly, the predicate letter A (k) 2 ), that is, σ 1 = σ 0 ∪ {R (k) }. The belief set B 2 is formed from B 1 by adding the labeled formula ((∀x)(R (k) (x) → ¬P ( p) 2 (x)), {2, {hu}, ∅, bel, 0.5, a posteriori}), here again including the extralogical occurrence index on P ( p) . The hierarchy H 2 is formed from H 1 by adding the node ¬P ( p) 2 and the has-property link (R (k) , P ( p) 2 ). Consider an input of Q (k) (Nixon). This is an event of Type 1. The language L 3 is formed from L 2 by adding the symbol Nixon (or more exactly, the individual constant a 1 ). The belief set B 3 is formed from B 2 by adding the labeled formula (Q (k) (Nixon), {3, {hu}, ∅, bel, 0.5, a posteriori}). The hierarchy H 3 is formed from H 2 by adding the node Nixon and the object-kind link (Nixon, Q (k) ). The algorithm for Event Type 1 then proceeds to apply Aristotelian Syllogism to Q (k) (Nixon) and the previously input formula (∀x)(Q (k) (x) → P ( p) 1 (x)) to infer P ( p) 1 (Nixon) and provide this to the controller. This is an event of Type 3. The algorithm for Event Type 3 (i) sets L 4 = L 3 ; (ii) forms B 4 from B 3 by adding the labeled formula (P ( p) 1 (Nixon), {4, F, ∅, bel, 0.5, a posteriori}), where the from-list F = {AristotelianSyllogism, 3, 1}, and changes the to-lists of formulas 3 and 1 from ∅ to {4}; and (iii) sets H 4 = H 3 . The algorithm for Event Type 3 then proceeds to scan the current belief set B 4 for any active occurrences of ¬P ( p) (Nixon) (ignoring the extralogical occurrence indexes) and fails to find any.
Consider an input of R (k) (Nixon). This is an event of Type 1. This sets L 5 = L 4 and H 5 = H 4 . The belief set B 5 is formed from B 4 by adding the labeled formula (R (k) (Nixon), {5, {hu}, ∅, bel, 0.5, a posteriori}). The algorithm for Event Type 1 then proceeds to apply Aristotelian Syllogism to R (k) (Nixon) and the previously input formula (∀x)(R (k) (x) → ¬P ( p) 1 (x)) to infer ¬P ( p) 2 (Nixon) and provide this to the controller. This is an event of Type 4. The algorithm for Event Type 4 (i) sets L 6 = L 5 ; (ii) forms B 6 from B 5 by adding the labeled formula (¬P ( p) 2 (Nixon), {6, F, ∅, bel, 0.5, a pos-teriori}), where the from-list F = {AristotelianSyllogism, 5, 2}, and changes the to-lists of formulas 5 and 2 from ∅ to {6}; and (iii) sets H 6 = H 5 . The algorithm for Event Type 4 then proceeds to scan the current belief set B 6 for any active occurrences of P ( p) (Nixon) and finds the formula with index 4. This triggers an application of Contradiction Detection, which derives ⊥ and provides this to the controller. This is an event of Type 5. This sets L 7 = L 6 and H 7 = H 6 . B 7 is formed from B 6 by adding the labeled formula (⊥, {7, F, ∅, bel, 0.5, a posteriori}), where the from-list F = {ContradictionDetection, 6, 4}, and changes the to-lists of formulas 6 and 4 from ∅ to {7}.
Then Dialectical Belief Revision is invoked. All formulas that were input by the user are candidates for belief change. Suppose that the formula with index 2, namely (∀x)(R (k) (x) → ¬P ( p) 2 (x)), is chosen. Then the procedure forward chains through to lists, starting with this formula, and changes to disbel the status first of formula 6, ¬P ( p) 2 (Nixon), and then of formula 7, ⊥. This results in L 8 = L 7 ; B 8 is the belief set obtained from B 7 by making the three indicated belief status changes; and H 8 is formed from H 7 by removing the links (Nixon, R (k) ) and (R (k) , ¬P ( p) 2 ), leaving only the left side of the hierarchy in Figure 7 .
Further well-known puzzles that can be resolved similarly within an MIS are the others discussed in Schwartz [1997] , namely Bosco the Blue Whale [Stein 1992 ], Suzie the Platypus [Stein 1992 ], Clyde the Royal Elephant [Touretzky et al. 1987] , and Expanded Nixon Diamond [Touretzky et al. 1987] ,
Saliency
That an MIS controller produces all relevant salient information as prescribed in the foregoing can be summarized as a pair of theorems.
THEOREM 5.1. The foregoing algorithms serve to maintain the hierarchy with respect to the object and kind nodes as a DAG without redundant links.
Thus, leaf nodes will be either object nodes or kind nodes that have no assigned objects. If an object is linked to some kind node, it is not directly linked to any ancestors of that kind node, and no kind node is directly linked to any of its ancestors other than its parents. This makes the hierarchy useful for visualization and browsing.
In addition, the algorithms ensure that the belief set will contain explicit representation of all and only the object-kind classifications implicit in the hierarchy. This amounts to the following. THEOREM 5.2. After any process initiated by a user input terminates, the resulting belief set will contain a formula of the form α (k) (a) or α ( p) (a) or ¬α ( p) (a) if and only if the formula is derivable from the formulas corresponding to links in the inheritance hierarchy, observing the specificity principle.
Correctness
It is desired to establish the analog of Theorem 7 for the MIS DRS. Here the concern is with maintaining consistency with respect to all formulas except those expressing that the elements of a kind have some property, as inconsistencies among these are allowed.
THEOREM 5.3. For any derivation path in an MIS, the belief set that results at the conclusion of a process initiated by a user input will be consistent with respect to the formulas of the forms α (k) (a), (∀x)(α (k) (x) → β ( p) (x)), and α ( p) (a).
CONCLUDING REMARKS
This work has introduced a computational framework for nonmonotonic belief revision. The objective is to model the reasoning processes of an intelligent agent. Reasoning is portrayed as a temporal activity with inference rule applications occurring in discrete timesteps. In this sense, to reason is to act, and the reasoning activity is carried out by a controller in response to inputs from the environment. In the examples given, the environment consists of a human user, and each input into the current belief set triggers an algorithm involving a series of such steps, where each step entails updating the existing belief set by either (i) entering a new formula into the set or (ii) changing some items in the label attached to a formula in the set.
In the former case, the newly entered formula may trigger a recursive invocation of the controller leading to a succeeding series of reasoning steps, potentially adding further new formulas into the belief set. In the latter case, if the label change involves switching the formula's status indicator from "believed" to "disbelieved," this amounts to retracting that formula from the current list of assumptions. Such occurs as the result of the nonmonotonic process here referred to as Dialectical Belief Revision. Inasmuch as the algorithms described in Sections 4 and 5 are recursive, the reasoning activities of the example agents are analogous to the well-known "agent loop" employed by robots wherein the robot reacts to inputs received from controllers and adapts its actions accordingly. This is sometimes referred to as reactive control (e.g., cf. Martin [2001] ). Strictly speaking, however, the action of making changes in the belief set is to be distinguished from the act of making changes in the agent's condition or environment, which is where the notion of reactive control is meant to apply. In particular, the agents discussed in this article only act in response to user inputs, and so their behavior is not reactive in the latter sense. At the same time, however, it may noted that the types of reasoning algorithms described herein could in fact be employed in the broader context of reactive control. For example, in robot path planning with replanning, the replanning phase effectively is an instance on nonmonotonic reasoning wherein the robot discovers that its current plan cannot succeed and that generation of a new plan based on newly acquired information is required. For this reason, robot path planning is a potential fertile ground for future applications of the DRS framework.
The present treatment has employed classical first-order predicate calculus as the underlying reasoning system, but the DRS framework can accommodate virtually any well-defined logic. In each of the examples given, an application-specific controller was provided and proven to be adequate and correct for the intended application. These proofs required that the logic have a well-defined semantics and be sound with respect to that semantics. Although it is difficult to speculate about further applications, it seems likely that such typically will be necessary and sufficient. In any case, semantic completeness of the logic does not seem to be required.
This work has laid a foundation for a new approach to nonmonotonic reasoning; however, it leaves several issues yet to be addressed. First, the formula labels considered herein have included a place for an epistemic entrenchment value, but these have not been employed in the present examples, although it certainly would be possible to do so. These could be used to remove the human from the loop when undergoing Dialectical Belief Revision, by using such values to automatically choose what extralogical axioms to disbelieve. At issue, however, is how to determine exactly what should be the epistemic entrenchment value for any given formula. There has been some work on this by others. For example, Spohn [1988] describes a method for ordering the propositions in a possible-worlds semantics by increasing degrees of disbelief, in which case the most entrenched would be the least disbelieved. The present work does not employ this type of semantics, however, and it is not clear whether the same approach can be employed in this context. The issues of how to assign, interpret, and employ epistemic entrenchment factors have accordingly been reserved for future work.
Second is the issue of minimal change discussed in the AGM literature. This refers to the principle that when retracting earlier held propositions, this should be done in such a way as to preserve as much of the prior knowledge as possible. Whether or not this principle is desirable depends on the application context, but in general it seems reasonable. This issue has not been discussed in the present work, but the principle could easily be implemented by adding the appropriate requirements into the process of dialectical belief revision. If epistemic entrenchment factors are employed for deciding what propositions to retract, then this relates to the first issue and would best be discussed in that context.
Third is the computational complexity of the controller. Clearly, this must be studied for each different controller; there can be no general statements regarding this. For the examples considered in this article, however, the complexity seems manageable.
The reason for saying this is that the inference processes always move upward in a DAG rather than downward, so they do not have the search patterns that tend toward combinatorial explosion.
Last, the present work has provided all of the precise mathematical details necessary for a software implementation. Developing such an implementation would be a substantial undertaking, however, and before doing so, it would be warranted to demonstrate that the DRS can be employed in practical real-world applications. The work thus far has provided only toy applications to illustrate the core ideas, and the prospects for substantive real-world applications have yet to be explored.
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